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Why Limited Liability Company
Membership Interests Should Not be
Treated as Securities and Possible
Steps to Encourage this Result
by
CAROL R. GOFORTH*
The limited liability company (LLC) is a new form of business
entity in this country. An LLC is an entity that takes many of the
most desirable attributes of the partnership and combines them with
the most desirable features of the corporation. Like a partnership, the
LLC has extreme organizational flexibility and tax benefits, such as
the ability to make special allocations of income and loss and the lack
of taxation at the entity level.' Like a corporation, the LLC features
limited personal liability for all owners.2
Another way of looking at LLCs, which explains why they have
gained such ready acceptance, is to compare the LLC with other busi-
ness alternatives. The primary advantage that LLCs offer over part-
nerships is limited liability. Even limited partnerships cannot, by their
very nature, offer limited liability to all equity participants.3 The most
significant advantages LLCs have over C Corporations is that the
LLC permits owners to avoid the double taxation currently burdening
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law. J.D., Univer-
sity of Arkansas School of Law, 1984. The Author would like to thank Professors Carter
Bishop and Daniel Kleinberger for first bringing this issue to her attention and for their
insights on limited liability companies in general.
1. See Thomas Earl Geu, Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A Basic
Comparative Primer (Part Two), 37 S.D. L. REv 467 (1992) [hereinafter Geu, Understand-
ing the LLC, Part Two]; Susan Kalinka, The Limited Liability Company and Subchapter S:
Classification Issues Revisited, 60 U. GIN. L. REv. 1083, 1103-23 (1992).
2. The LLC has been summarized as a "non-corporate [form of] business that pro-
vides its members with limited liability and allows the members to participate actively in
the entity's management." Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A
Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. 375, 384, 387 (1992) (footnote omitted).
3. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHip Acr § 9, 6 U.L.A. 586-87 (1916); REv. UNiF. LTD.
PARTNERSHIP Acr § 403(b), 6 U.L.A. 465 (Supp. 1994).
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the corporate form,4 while simultaneously avoiding the often cumber-
some corporate management structure dictated by statute.5
Even S Corporations cannot offer all the advantages of LLCs.
For instance, shareholders in S Corporations are generally required to
cede management authority to directors and to adhere to corporate
formalities. In addition, the subchapter S rules of the Internal Reve-
nue Code are highly restrictive, limiting the number and kind of
shareholders, and essentially prohibiting special allocations among
shareholders by limiting S Corporations to one class of stock.6
On the other hand, LLCs are not without drawbacks. While
there are currently numerous potential disadvantages to LLCs, none
is more troubling than the tremendous uncertainty surrounding this
entity. Much of the uncertainty stems from the fact that not all juris-
dictions have passed legislation recognizing LLCs as separate legal en-
tities.7 Even in jurisdictions that have enabling legislation, the lack of
4. I.R.C. §§ 301-385 (West 1989) (describing corporate distributions and
adjustments).
5. "A corporation must be organized and managed by natural persons. Their qualifi-
cations, functions and procedures are often prescribed by a hierarchy of constitutions, stat-
utes and administrative rules and regulations .... HARRY G. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 180, at 343 (2d ed. 1970).
Henn's description of corporate management extends for more than 150 pages of his one
volume treatise. Id. at 341-504.
6. S Corporations are governed by subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code.
I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379 (West 1989). Section 1361 restricts the availability of the beneficial
subchapter S provisions. For example, subsection (b) provides an S corporation may have:
only one class of stock, no more than 35 shareholders, and only individuals as sharehold-
ers. In addition, an S Corporation may not have a non-resident alien as a shareholder and
may not be a member of an affiliated group. I.R.C. § 1361(b).
7. This particular problem may soon disappear. As of the end of 1993, only a hand-
ful of American states had failed to enact LLC legislation. The following information
about introduction and enactment of LLC legislation was obtained from the BILLTRK
database on WESTLAW. According to the bill tracking service on WESTLAW, the fol-
lowing states introduced LLC legislation in 1993 (citations are in WESTLAW search for-
mat): 1993 CA S.B. 469 (introduced Feb. 25, 1993); 1993 HI H.B. 863 (introduced Jan. 22,
1993); 1993 ME H.P. 1123 (introduced May 17, 1993); 1993 NY S.B. 27 (introduced Jan. 6,
1993); 1993 OH S.B. 74 (introduced Mar. 11, 1993); 1993 PA H.B. 1719 (introduced May
28, 1993); 1993 SC H.B. 4283 (introduced June 3, 1993); 1993 TN H.B. 952 (introduced Feb.
15, 1993); 1993 WA H.B. 1235 (introduced Jan. 20, 1993).
By March of 1994, every other American jurisdiction was actively considering LLC
legislation. 1994 AK H.B. 420 (introduced Jan. 31, 1994); 1994 KY S.B. 184 (introduced
Feb. 7, 1994); 1994 MA S.B. 72 (introduced Jan. 25, 1994); 1994 MS H.B. 733 (Jan. 6, 1994);
1994 VT S.B. 314 (introduced Jan. 13, 1994). It is also worth noting that of the states
waiting until 1994 to propose LLC legislation, Mississippi had earlier enacted a statute
recognizing foreign LLCs, 1993 Miss. Laws 530 (Miss. H.B. 743), and Alaska was the first
state to consider adopting LLC legislation, even before the Wyoming Legislature acted.
See R. Johnson, Comment, The Limited Liability Company Act, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
387, 387 n.2 (1983).
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case law and legal commentary in the area gives rise to a number of
troubling issues. Moreover, the inconsistencies among various LLC
statutes also create many potential problems.
The first statute authorizing domestic LLCs was passed in Wyo-
ming in 1977.8 Florida adopted similar legislation in 1982,9 but there
were no further legislative developments until after 1988,10 when the
Internal Revenue Service concluded that an LLC organized under the
Wyoming statute was taxable as a partnership." The IRS ruling re-
sulted in a trickle of new legislation that turned into a virtual flood of
statutes authorizing the new form of business entity by the middle of
1993.
In fact, by July 1, 1994, a number of these states had enacted LLC legislation. The
Mississippi LLC Act was signed into law by the Governor on March 15, 1994; LLC legisla-
tion was signed by the Governors of Ohio and Washington on April 1, 1994; the Kentucky
LLC Act was signed by the Governor on April 11, 1994; the Governor of Maine signed
LLC legislation on April 20; the Tennessee Governor did so on April 26; on June 8, 1994,
the Governor of Alaska signed into law the Alaska LLC Act; and the Governor of South
Carolina signed South Carolina LLC legislation on June 16, 1994.
8. Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -136 (1989 & Supp. 1994).
9. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401 -.514 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
10. As of February 22, 1988 there were only 26 Wyoming LLCs. Joseph P. Fonfara &
Corey R. McCool, Comment, The Wyoming Limited Liability Company: A Viable Alterna-
tive to the S Corporation and the Limited Partnership?, 23 LAND & WATER L. REv. 523,
531 (1988). Since the Wyoming statute had been in existence for more than a decade at
that time, it is clear that the popularity of LLCs was quite limited until the IRS determined
that they could be classified as partnerships.
11. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. This revenue ruling was issued only after a
lengthy period of confusion about how the IRS would regard LLCs. The IRS had issued a
private letter ruling in 1980 which concluded that a particular Wyoming LLC would be
treated as a partnership for tax purposes, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-06-082 (Nov. 18, 1980), but had
also issued a private letter ruling in 1982 finding that another Wyoming LLC would be
taxed as a corporation, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-04-138 (Oct. 29, 1982).
In 1980 a proposed amendment to the partnership tax regulations was issued that
would have provided that no organization offering the characteristic of limited liability to
all of its members could qualify for tax treatment as a corporation. 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709
(1980) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301) (proposed Nov. 17, 1980). This amendment was
withdrawn in 1983. 48 Fed. Reg. 14,389 (1983).
After this sequence of events, the IRS began a study project to determine how LLCs
should be classified for tax purposes, focusing on how the limited liability attribute of this
entity should affect the outcome. See Announcement 83-4, 1983-2 I.R.B. 30. In 1988 this
study concluded that the limited liability aspect of LLCs should not, by itself, prevent an
LLC from being classified as a partnership for tax purposes. See Turlington & Small, Tax
Aspects of Limited Liability Companies (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series, 805 PLI/Corp. 103 (Feb. 1, 1993)). The Wyoming Revenue Ruling discussed in the
text was released after completion of this study project.
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In 1990 both Colorado and Kansas enacted LLC legislation; 12 Ne-
vada, Texas, Utah, and Virginia followed suit in 1991.13 In 1992 Ari-
zona, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and West Virginia all passed statutes au-
thorizing LLCs,'14 and 18 states enacted LLC legislation in 1993.15 By
March of 1994 every other American state was considering legislation
authorizing LLCs. By July 1, 1994, eight more states had enacted stat-
utes, leaving only a handful of states that do not have some form of
LLC legislation enacted. 16
One of many open issues is the extent to which federal securities
laws will apply to membership interests in LLCs. At the time this
Article was written, there were two views on the proper classification
12. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80-101 to -913 (West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17-7601 to -7651 (Supp. 1993).
13. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.010-86.571 (Michie 1994); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 1528n, §§ 1.01-11.07 (West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2b-101 to -158
(1994 & Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1073 (Michie 1993).
14. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-601 to -857 (Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§§ 18-101 to -1106 (1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994);
IOWA CODE §§ 490A.100 to .1601 (West Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1301 to
:1369 (West Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS §§ 4A-101 to -1103 (1993);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 322B.01 - .960 (West Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2000-
2060 (West Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-16-1 to -75 (1992 & Supp. 1993); W. VA.
CODE § 31-lA-1 to -69 (Supp. 1994).
15. LLC legislation was enacted into law during 1993 in the following jurisdictions:
Alabama (1993 Ala. Acts 724 (codified at ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-1 to -61 (Supp. 1993)));
Arkansas (1993 Ark. Acts 1003, § 101 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-32-101 to -1314
(Michie Supp. 1993))); Connecticut (Connecticut Limited Liability Company Act, 1993
Conn. Pub. Acts 93-267); Georgia (codified at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-11-100 to -1109 (Har-
rison Supp. 1993)); Idaho (1993 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 244, §§ 1 (codified at IDAHO CODE
§§ 53-601 to -672 (1994))); Indiana (1993 Ind. Acts 485, §§ 301 (codified at IND. CODE § 23-
18-1-1 to 23-18-13-1 (Supp. 1994))); Michigan (Michigan Limited Liability Company Act,
1993 Mich. Pub. Acts 23 (codified at MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.4101 to -.5200 (West
Supp. 1994))); Missouri (Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 Mo. Laws 146 (codified at
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 359.700 - .908 (1993))); Montana (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-
8-101 to -1307 (1993)); Nebraska (1993 Neb. Laws 121 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-
2601 to -2645 (Supp. 1993))); New Hampshire (1993 N.H. Laws 313 (codified at N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 304-C:1 to 304-C:58 (Supp. 1993)(effective July 1, 1993))); New Jersey (N.J.
Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 N.J. Laws 210 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:2B-
1 to -70 (West Supp. 1994))); New Mexico (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-19-1 to -74
(Michie Repl. 1993)); North Dakota (North Dakota Limited Liability Company Act, ch.
92, § 8 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-32-01 to -155 (1994))); Oregon 1993 Or. S.B.
285 (signed June 24, 1993) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. §§ 63.001 to .990 (Supp. 1994)); and
South Dakota (1993 S.D. Laws 46 (codified at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-34-1 to -59
(1994))). In addition, Mississippi enacted a statute recognizing foreign LLCS in this time
period. 1993 Miss. Laws 530.
16. See supra note 7. As of July 1, 1994, the only states lacking LLC legislation were
California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, and Vermont.
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of LLC membership interests for purposes of the federal securities
laws.17 One of those views is that most LLC membership interests
probably are not securities under either the federal or state law defini-
tion;' 8 the other view is that most LLC membership interests probably
are securities.19  No commentator has analyzed in much detail
whether LLC membership interests should be regulated as securities
or, once that question is answered, suggested steps that might be
taken to encourage courts to reach the better conclusion. This Article
addresses the issues of whether the federal securities laws are likely to
apply to LLC membership interests under existing legal doctrines;
whether those laws ought to apply; and what steps can be taken to
lead courts to reach the best result.
The first Section of the Article discusses the nature of the LLC
and membership interests therein. The range of options available
under state statutes with regard to the organization and operation of
LLCs is analyzed, along with the practical requirements imposed by
the necessity of creating an association that is recognized as a partner-
ship for federal tax purposes. Because there are now so many articles
that fill this descriptive function,20 this Section provides no more than
an overview of the LLC as a new form of business entity.
The second Section of the Article is predictive. It examines the
method by which courts will likely approach the question of whether,
and under what circumstances, LLC membership interests will be
treated as securities. A variety of possible approaches to the issue are
discussed, including approaches suggested by other commentators in
the area. Because this Article concludes that the most likely approach
is for courts to analyze whether LLC membership interests qualify as
investment contracts, a significant portion of this Section is devoted to
17. Mark A. Sargent, Are Limited Liability Company Interests Securities?, 19 PEPP. L.
REv. 1069 (1992); Marc I. Steinberg & Karen L. Conway, The Limited Liability Company
as a Security, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 1105 (1992). A number of other articles address the issue
more briefly. See, e.g., Geu, Understanding the LLC, Part Two, supra note 1, at 510-18.
18. Sargent, supra note 17, at 1102-03.
19. Steinberg & Conway, supra note 17, at 1122.
20. See, e.g., Wayne M. Gazur & Neil M. Goff, Assessing the Limited Liability Com-
pany, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 387 (1991); Thomas Earl Geu, Understanding the Limited
Liability Company: A Basic Comparative Primer (Part One), 37 S.D. L. REv. 43 (1992);
Geu, Understanding the LLC, Part Two, supra note 1; Richard M. Horwood & Jeffrey A.
Hechtman, The Better Alternative: The Limited Liability Company, 20 J. REAL EST. TAX'N
348 (1993); Kalinka, supra note 1; Keatinge et al., supra note 2; Louis A. Mezzullo, Limited
Liability Companies: A New Business Form, 21 TAX'N FOR LAW. 296 (1993); Sylvester J.
Orsi, The Limited Liability Company: An Organizational Alternative for Small Businesses,
70 NEB. L. REv. 150 (1991); Ronald P. Platner, Limited Liability Companies are Increas-
ingly Popular, 20 TAX'N FOR LAW. 225 (1992).
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that analysis. This Section of the Article ultimately concludes that
although most LLC membership interests should not be classified as
securities under the existing rules, there is sufficient variation in the
LLC form that some membership interests should be classified as se-
curities under current jurisprudence.
The third Section of the Article is normative, dealing with the
question of whether federal securities laws ought to apply to LLC
membership interests. It includes a review of the purposes behind the
federal securities laws and the consequences that follow the character-
ization of LLC membership interests as securities. This Section con-
cludes that membership interests in LLCs should generally not be
characterized as securities because the purposes of the federal securi-
ties laws will not be substantially advanced by such a characterization.
Moreover, the costs of regulation as securities are likely to outweigh
the benefits.
The final Section of the Article suggests measures that might en-
courage courts to conclude that most LLC membership interests are
not securities. This Section includes suggested statutory provisions
that will likely result in LLC membership interests that will not be
classified as securities. Since state LLC statutes are so new, no model
legislation has yet been promulgated in this area. However, there are
two versions of model legislation in the drafting stage.21 Given the
new and unsettled status of LLC legislation, it is not surprising that
many states are undertaking review and amendment of their LLC
statutes. This analysis is designed to offer some guidance to legisla-
tures in amending LLC statutory provisions or in adopting such legis-
lation for the few remaining states that may pass LLC statutes in the
21. Groups working under the auspices of both the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association started work on model
LLC legislation. The ABA's project was conducted under the auspices of a Working
Group on the Prototype Limited Liability Company Act, Subcommittee on Limited Liabil-
ity Companies, Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Organizations,
Section of Business Law, a group that was never formally approved by the ABA or any of
its standing sections or committees. It circulated a Draft Prototype LLC Act for comment
in 1992. DRAFT PROTOTYPE LLC AcT (1992). This project has apparently been aban-
doned in favor of the work being conducted by the other group.
The National Conference group first circulated a discussion draft of a proposed Uni-
form LLC Act in 1993. Draft for Discussion Only, NCCUSL, UNIF. LLC ACr (1993
Draft). After undergoing substantial revisions, a draft was prepared for final submission to
the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws for consideration at
their summer 1994 meeting. Draft for Approval, NCCUSL, UNIF. LLC Acr (1994 Draft).
Because the draft for approval was finished after this Article was substantially complete,
internal references to the draft Uniform LLC Act are to the earlier discussion draft and
not the final draft for approval.
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future. The last half of this Section makes suggestions about organiz-
ing LLCs under the various statutory regimes to increase the likeli-
hood that courts will decline to apply the federal securities laws to
particular LLC membership interests. Even if state legislatures do not
adopt provisions to make it less likely that federal securities legisla-
tion will apply to LLC membership interests, planners in most juris-
dictions have a wide range of options in drafting organizational and
operating documents for LLCs. Therefore, the thrust of this Section is
to provide persons wishing to avoid application of the securities laws
with guidance in drafting organizational and operating documents for
the LLC that make this result more likely.
I. What Are LLC Membership Interests?
The LLC is a statutorily created business form. As described
briefly in the introduction, it is a business form that blends the most
desirable attributes of partnerships and corporations. Like a partner-
ship, 2 it is extremely flexible and, if properly formed, 3 avoids taxa-
tion at the entity level. As with a corporation, the owners are shielded
from liability for debts created by the entity.24 Unlike the limited
22. This statement is true only if the LLC is formed so as to qualify as a partnership
for federal tax purposes. See infra notes 36-60 and accompanying text.
23. There are actually two types of LLC statutes. One is the so-called "bullet-proof'
legislation, typified by the Wyoming LLC Act. Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -143 (1989 &
Supp. 1994). LLCs properly formed under this type of statute will be classified as partner-
ships for federal tax purposes. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
The other type of LLC statute, which has been selected by most of the states with LLC
legislation, is flexible, allowing drafters to choose between characteristics. The result is
that it is possible to form an LLC that will be classified as an association taxable as a
corporation for federal tax purposes rather than as a partnership. See infra at notes 36-60
and accompanying text.
Because the tax benefits of classification as a partnership are likely to be a significant
factor in choosing the LLC as a choice of business entity, it is presumed that most LLCs
will be formed with the expectation of being classified as a partnership for federal tax
purposes.
24. E.g., ALA. CODE § 10-12-20 (Supp. 1993); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-651
(Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-304 (Michie Supp. 1993); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 7-80-705 (West Supp. 1993); Connecticut Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 Conn.
Pub. Acts 93-267, § 19(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-303 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 608.436 (West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-303 (Harrison Supp. 1993); IDAHO
CODE § 53-619 (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para 180/10-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994);
IND. CODE § 23-18-3-3(a) (Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.601 (West Supp. 1994);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7620 (Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1320 (West Supp.
1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-301 (1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 450.4501 (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT ANN. § 322B.303 (West Supp. 1994); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 347.069 (1993)(actually providing that members are not proper parties to litigation
against the LLC); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-304 (1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2614 (Supp.
partnership, which also combines certain partnership and corporate
attributes, there is no requirement that at least one owner be sub-
jected to unlimited personal liability; nor is there any prohibition on
members with limited liability participating in control. 25 Unlike the S
corporation-another hybrid of partnership and corporations-there
are no limitations on who can invest in an LLC, and it is possible to
achieve tax recognition of special allocations. 26
Aside from the benefits of avoiding double taxation while provid-
ing limited liability for investors, the biggest attraction of the LLC as a
business form is the extreme flexibility offered by most state statutes.
Most LLC statutes do not mandate any particular management struc-
ture.27 This treatment contrasts starkly with the detailed statutory re-
1993); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.371 (Michie 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:25
(Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-23 (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-13
(Michie Repl. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-30 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-29.1
(1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2022 (West Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.077
(Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-23 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-34-17
(1994); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 4.03 (West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 48-2b-109 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1019 (Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-33
(Supp. 1994); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-113 (1989 & Supp. 1994).
25. As is the case with limited partnerships. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9, 6
U.L.A. 586-87 (1969); REV. UNIV. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 403(b), 6 U.L.A. 465 (Supp.
1994).
26. I.R.C. § 1361 (West 1989).
27. Most LLC statutes provide for member-management as a default model, but ex-
pressly permit LLCs to elect a different management structure if so desired. ALA. CODE
§ 10-12-22(a) (Supp. 1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-654 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-32-301 (Michie Supp. 1993); Connecticut Limited Liability Company Act, 1993
Conn. Pub. Acts 93-267, § 26; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 608.422 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-304 (Harrison Supp. 1993);
IDAHO CODE § 53-621 (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/10-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1994); IND. CODE § 23-18-4-1 (Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.702 (West Supp.
1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1311 (West
Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 4A-401 (1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 450.4401 (West Supp. 1994); Mo. REv. STAT. § 347.079 (1993); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 35-8-401 (1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2615 (Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 86.291 (Michie 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-27 (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-19-15 (Michie Repl. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-20 (1993); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 63.057 (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-14 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-
34-16 (1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125 (1994 & Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
1022 (Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-18 (Supp. 1994); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-116 (1989
& Supp. 1994).
A few states provide for manager-management as the default rule, but permit an LLC
to elect member-management if that is desired. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.606.1 (West
Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2013 (West Supp. 1994); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 1528n, § 2.12 (West Supp. 1994). The effect of New Hampshire's statute is un-
clear, since it provides that if managers are not specifically designated, management rights
shall be vested in a member. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:31(II) (Supp. 1993). It is not
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quirements dealing with the lines of demarcation between shareholder
and director authority in the corporate setting. 8 The LLC is not pro-
hibited from adopting an organizational structure that delegates man-
agement authority to others, who might then serve much as directors
do in American corporations. However, this structure is certainly not
required by most state statutes.29
There are, of course, some basic characteristics common to all or
most LLCs. All LLCs are formed upon the filing of an organizational
document, most often called articles of organization.30 The owners
are referred to as members, rather than shareholders or partners.31 In
clear if this means all members will have management rights, or if the members must elect
one member to represent them.
The Colorado LLC statute clearly mandates the manager-management model. This is
the only state that unequivocally mandates one management model in preference to others.
CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-401 (West Supp. 1993). The North Dakota statute can also
be interpreted as mandating the election of a board of governors, but since the statute also
says that if the members desire to act by unanimous consent or vote they do not need to
have governors, this is not entirely certain. N.D. CENT. CODE. § 10-32-69.1 (1994).
28. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAws OF CORPORAnONS §§ 180-
242, at 466-663 (3d ed. 1983).
29. As mentioned earlier, Colorado does mandate the appointment of managers.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-401 (West Supp. 1993). See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-
32-69.1 (1994).
30. E.g., ALA. CODE § 10-12-9 (Supp. 1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-632 (Supp.
1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-102(a) (Michie Supp. 1993); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-
80-204 (West Supp. 1993); Connecticut Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 Conn. Pub.
Acts 93-267, § 11; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-201 (1993) (called certificate of formation);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.407 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-101(1)
(Harrison Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 53-607 (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/1-
5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IND. CODE § 23-18-1-3 (Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 490A.303 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7607 (Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12:1305 (West Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-204 (1993 &
Supp.); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4102(2)(b) (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 322B.115 (West Supp. 1994); Mo. REv. STAT. § 347.037 (1993); MoTr. CODE ANN. § 35-
8-202 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2606 (Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.161
(Michie 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:12 (Supp. 1993) (called certificate of forma-
tion); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-11a (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-7 (Michie
Repl. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-1-03(1) (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-07 (1994);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2004-2006 (Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.431 (Supp.
1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-6 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-34-12 (1994); TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 3.02 (West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-116
(1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1011 (Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-8 (Supp. 1994);
Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-107 (1989 & Supp. 1994).
31. For definition of "members," see ALA. CODE § 10-1202(i) (Supp. 1993); ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-601.9 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-1020) (Michie Supp.
1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-102(9) (West Supp. 1993); Connecticut Limited Lia-
bility Company Act, 1993 Conn. Pub. Acts 93-267, § 2(13); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-
101(10) (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.422 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994) (management is
vested in "members"); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-101(16) (Harrison Supp. 1993); IDAHO
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all but two jurisdictions, there must be at least two members in order
to operate an LLC.32 The internal affairs of the LLC are managed in
accordance with either the statutory default rules or with an operating
agreement or internal regulations agreed upon by the members.33
Owners can contribute cash, property, and, in most cases, services to
CODE § 53-601(10) (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/1-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994);
IND. CODE § 23-18-1-15 (Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.102.16 (West Supp. 1994);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7602(h) (Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1301.A(13) (West
Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-101(n) (1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 450.4102(2)(1) (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.03.30 (West Supp.
1994); Mo. REV. STAT. § 347.015(11)(1993); MONT. CODE ANN., § 35-8-102(15) (1993);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2615 (Supp. 1993) (management rights are vested in the "mem-
bers"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.081 (Michie 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-
C:1(X)(Supp. 1993)(signed June 23, 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-2(1) (West Supp.
1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-2.M (Michie Repl. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-1-03(13)
(1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-02.4 (1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2001.14 (West
Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.001(15)(Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-2(p) (1992);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-34-16 (1994)(management rights vested in "members");
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 4.01 (West Supp. 1994) (dealing with admission of
members to a Texas LLC); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125 (1994) (specifying management
rights of members); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1002 (Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-
2(10) (Supp. 1994) (defining members); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-122 (1989 & Supp. 1994)
(transfer of members' interests).
32. The two exceptions are Arkansas and Texas. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-32-201, 42-
32-1313 (Michie Supp. 1993); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, 3.01 (West Supp.
1994).
Some states also permit one person to form an LLC, but there must be two or more
members after formation. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1010, 13.1-1002 (Michie 1993).
33. E.g., ALA. CODE § 10-12024 (Supp. 1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-682
(Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-102(k) (Michie Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 7-80-102(11) (West Supp. 1993); Connecticut Limited Liability Company Act, 1993
Conn. Pub. Acts 93-267, § 2(14); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(b) (1993) (called "limited
liability company agreement"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.423 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994); GA.
CODE ANN. § 14-11-101(18) (Harrison Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 53-601(11) (1994); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/15-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IND. CODE § 23-18-1-16
(Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.703 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
7613 (Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1301.A(16) (West Supp. 1994); MD. CODE
ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 4A-402 (1993); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 450.4102(2)(n) (West
Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.603 (West Supp. 1994); Mo. REV. STAT. § 347.079
(1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-401(2) (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2615 (Supp. 1993)
(discussing the right to make an operating agreement); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.102
(Michie 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:1(VI)(Supp. 1993)(called a "limited liability
company agreement"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-2 (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-19-2.0 (Michie Repl. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-1-03(10) (1993); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 10-32-02.31 (1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2001.16 (West Supp. 1994); OR.
REV. STAT. § 63.057 (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-2(s) (1992); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 47-34-1(6) (1994); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 2.09 (West Supp.
1994) (called regulations); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-126 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
1023 (Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-19 (Supp. 1994); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-116 (1989
& Supp. 1994) (discussing the operating agreement in the context of management
authority).
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the LLC in return for their membership interests.34 Absent agree-
ment to the contrary, the owners have no personal liability for debts
incurred by the LLC.35 Virtually all other attributes of LLCs vary de-
pending on either the statute under which they are organized or the
agreement between the members.
Given the flexibility of the LLC as a form of business entity, one
may wonder whether it is possible to discuss LLCs generally or
whether one must focus on the particular characteristics of a given
LLC. In fact, while many state statutes do not place any substantial
restrictions on LLC organization or management, there are limita-
tions imposed by virtue of the fact that the LLC is a tax-driven entity.
If the Internal Revenue Service was unwilling to classify LLCs as
partnerships for federal tax purposes, this discussion would be aca-
demic. In fact, until the IRS issued a revenue ruling in 1988 recogniz-
ing that Wyoming LLCs were taxable as partnerships, 36 LLCs were
While some statutes affirmatively require the adoption of an operating agreement, in
many jurisdictions the LLC statutes provide or imply that an operating agreement is not
necessary if the parties wish to be bound by the statutory default rules.
34. Most state LLC statutes permit contributions to an LLC in the form of tangible or
intangible property, cash, promissory notes, or services that have been or are to be per-
formed. See ALA. CODE § 10-12-26 (Supp. 1993); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-601(2)
(Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-501 (Michie Supp. 1993); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 7-80-501 (West Supp. 1993); Connecticut Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 Conn.
Pub. Acts 93-267, § 26; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(3) (1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-
11-401 (Harrison Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 53-626 (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para.
180/1-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993); IND. CODE § 23-18-1-5 (Supp. 1994); IowA CODE
§ 490A.102.3 (West Supp. 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:1201.A(3) (West Supp. 1994);
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-501 (1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 450.4301(1) (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322BA0.2 (West Supp. 1994); Mo.
REv. STAT. §§ 347.097, 347.099 (1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2614 (Supp. 1993)(allowing
contributions of any tangible or intangible property or benefit to the LLC; presumably this
would include services); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 86.041 (Michie 1994); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 304-C:36 (Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-32 (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 53-19-20 (Michie Repl. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-4-01 (1993); N.D. CETr.
CODE § 10-32-56.2 (1994) (not specifying services to be performed in the future); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2023 (West Supp. 1994); OR. REv. STAT. § 63.180(2) (Supp. 1994);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-2(e) (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-34-19 (1994) (not in-
cluding promissory notes or services to be performed in the future); TEx. REv. CiV. STAT.
ANN. art. 1528n, § 5.02 (West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-124 (1994); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-1027 (Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-23 (Supp. 1994).
Two states specifically exclude services from the list of permissible forms of contribu-
tions. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4211 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-115
(1989 & Supp. 1994). One state does not address the type of consideration that may be
received by an LLC. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601 to -7651 (Supp. 1993).
35. See statutes cited supra note 24.
36. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360 (discussing the classification of limited liability
companies as partnerships for tax purposes).
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virtually unheard of in this country.37 The popularity of the LLC
skyrocketed following this landmark revenue ruling.38 If the IRS ever
revises its position so that LLCs are no longer eligible for this tax
characterization, 39 their popularity is likely to disappear, or at least
substantially diminish.
This fact provides a meaningful limitation on the way in which
LLCs are organized and operated because the IRS has declined to
make partnership tax status automatic for LLCs.40 As with other un-
incorporated associations, the IRS applies a multi-factored analysis in
determining whether partnership or corporate tax rules should apply.
The current Treasury regulations tax an unincorporated associa-
tion as a corporation if the entity has more corporate characteristics
than partnership characteristics. 4' The six characteristics indicative of
a corporation are: (1) an association of persons; (2) with the purpose
of carrying on a business and dividing the gains; (3) having continuity
of life; (4) centralization of management; (5) limited liability; and (6)
free transferability of interests.42 Since the first two characteristics are
also present in partnerships, they are generally not helpful in deter-
mining whether a particular association should be taxed as one or the
37. See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
38. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. As discussed earlier, there had been two prior
private letter rulings addressing the tax status of Wyoming LLCs, but revenue rulings are
an official interpretation by the IRS published for the information and guidance of inter-
ested persons. Rev. Proc. 78-24, 1978-2 C.B. 503. Private letter rulings lack precedential
value. See I.R.C. § 61100)(3) (1993)(written determination may not be used or cited as
precedent); Rev. Proc. 79-45, 1979-2 C.B. 508, 520 (taxpayers may not "rely" on rulings
issued to other taxpayers).
39. It is, of course, by no means certain that the IRS will revise its current position.
At least one commentator has suggested that any such action would be politically unac-
ceptable at this time. Kalinka, supra note 1, at 1146. However, commentators and the
courts have criticized the current rules, providing some basis for believing that a change is
at least conceivable. For a listing of some of the more recent criticism, see Kalinka, supra
note 1, at 1145-46 n.328.
40. This is not at all surprising since the IRS has also declined to make partnership
status automatic for associations organized as partnerships.
41. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 1993). The mechanical approach of
giving all characteristics equal weight and simply adding up the totals was adopted by the
Tax Court in Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), acq. 1979-1 C.B. 1.
When an LLC splits the last four characteristics evenly, it will be treated as a partner-
ship for tax purposes. See Rev. Rul. 93-5, 1993-1 C.B. 227 (Virginia LLC having centralized
management and limited liability, but lacking continuity of life and free transferability is a
partnership for tax purposes); Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-1 C.B. 229 (same for Colorado LLC);
Rev. Rul. 93-30, 1993-1 C.B. 231 (same for Nevada LLC).
42. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 1993). See also Rev. Rul. 79-106,
1979-1 C.B. 448.
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other.43 As a result, the four remaining characteristics are typically
dispositive.44
The objective of any entity seeking partnership status for tax pur-
poses is to possess no more than two of the four dispositive character-
istics. For an LLC, of course, the objective is even more restrictive.
One of the four dispositive characteristics is limited liability.
Although it is conceivable under some of the LLC statutes that an
LLC could be formed that does not provide its members with limited
liability, the chances of this being the case are remote. Thus, because
an LLC will possess the "corporate" characteristic of limited liability,
it must have no more than one of the three remaining characteristics.
This means that in order to retain the tax benefits offered by the LLC
choice of entity, planners must organize the LLC so that it does not
have more than one of the following characteristics: (1) continuity of
life; (2) centralization of management; and (3) free transferability of
interests.45
The characteristic of continuity of life exists when the entity con-
tinues to exist after the death, retirement, resignation, incapacity,
bankruptcy, or insolvency of one or more of its members.46 Corpora-
tions possess this characteristic because they continue to exist until
formally dissolved, regardless of what happens to any of the share-
holders. Partnerships generally lack this characteristic, since the part-
ners' status determines the continued existence of the partnership.
Unfortunately, there is no one statement about continuity of life
that will adequately address all LLCs. Some state statutes are worded
such that LLCs formed in those jurisdictions will probably lack con-
tinuity of life. These statutes generally require that the LLC dissolve
upon withdrawal of any member, whether by death, retirement, resig-
nation, incapacitation, bankruptcy, or insolvency.47 Because such stat-
43. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (as amended in 1993).
44. Id.
45. This very mechanical approach has been endorsed by the tax regulations, which
provide that "[a]n unincorporated organization shall not be classified as an association
[which would be taxable as a corporation] unless such organization has more corporate
characteristics than non-corporate characteristics." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (as
amended in 1993) (emphasis added); Larson, 66 T.C. at 159.
46. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1993) (describing the existence of
continuity of life for an organization).
47. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-801 (West Supp. 1993); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 490A.1301 (West Supp. 1994); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.80 (West Supp. 1994); NEv.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 86.491 (Michie 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2037 (West Supp.
1994); VA. CODF ANN. § 13.1-1046 (Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE § 13-1A-35 (Supp. 1994);
Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-123 (1989 & Supp. 1994).
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utes correspond so closely to partnership statutes in requiring
dissolution in the event of withdrawal by any member, LLCs formed
in accordance with such provisions will generally lack the characteris-
tic of continuity of life.
Other state statutes permit members to agree in advance in the
organizational documents that the LLC will continue in existence re-
gardless of the status of individual members.48 LLCs formed in these
jurisdictions will probably possess the characteristic of continuity of
life if the members elect in advance to have the LLC continue in exist-
ence. Conversely, if the members do not elect in advance to continue
the LLC after an event of withdrawal, the LLC will probably lack the
characteristic of continuity of life. In these jurisdictions, therefore, the
only way to tell if an LLC has this corporate characteristic is to con-
duct a case-by-case analysis.
Centralization of management-also clearly present in the case of
corporations and absent in the case of partnerships-may or may not
be present in LLCs. Centralization of management requires "concen-
tration of continuing exclusive authority" to manage the entity with-
out the approval of other members.49 The powers and authority of a
corporate board of directors satisfy this requirement, while a general
partnership typically lacks this characteristic since each partner has
the power to bind the partnership.50 Even if the general partners
delegate their authority to a managing partner or committee, they still
48. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-781 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-901
(Michie Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-801 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.441
(West 1993 & Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7622 (Supp. 1993); TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 6.01 (West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-137 (1994).
49. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(3) (as amended in 1993).
50. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (as amended in 1993). In addition, limited partner-
ships typically lack this characteristic as long as the general partner owns a "meaningful
proprietary interest" in the partnership. Larson, 66 T.C. at 177 (citing Zuckerman v.
United States, 524 F.2d 729 (Cl. Ct. 1975)). If the limited partners own more than 94.3% of
the total interest in the partnership, they own substantially all of the partnership interest
and the corporate characteristic of centralized management will be present. Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-3(b)(2) (example (1)) (as amended in 1993). Moreover, if the limited partners'
interests exceed 80% of the total partnership interests, the IRS will not issue a ruling that a
limited partnership lacks the characteristic of centralized management. Rev. Proc. 89-12,
1989-1 C.B. 798.
There is one other requirement that limited partnerships must meet in order to avoid
possessing the characteristic of centralized management: the limited partners must not
have an unrestricted right to remove the general partner. See, e.g., Zuckerman, 524 F.2d at
737-39; Larson, 66 T.C. at 176-79. Apparently, the theory is that if the limited partners
have an unrestricted right to remove the general partner, the general partner is under their
control and, therefore, acting as a central manager.
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have apparent authority to bind the partnership, which is enough to
avoid the characteristic of centralized management. 51
Most LLC statutes provide that members will manage the LLC
unless they agree otherwise.5 2 At least one, however, provides that
managers must control the LLC.5 3 The Minnesota, Oklahoma, and
Texas statutes take an intermediate position, specifying that LLCs
must be managed by managers unless the members agree otherwise.:54
To the extent that the relevant statute provides that members may
manage the LLC-subject to their right to delegate that authority to
one or more managers-a strong analogy can be drawn between LLCs
and partnerships. LLCs that provide members with apparent author-
ity to bind the enterprise also look very much like partnerships, even
if actual authority is delegated to selected managers.
The Uniform Partnership Act contemplates a wide degree of flex-
ibility in management options. The partners can either exercise con-
trol themselves or delegate their authority to others. This does not
change the fact that it is the partners who have the ultimate control.55
The same analysis can be applied to members in LLCs. As long as the
statutes give them the initial authority, the fact that they might choose
51. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (as amended in 1993) (describing characteristics of
centralized management).
52. See statutes cited supra note 27.
53. One state mandates the manager-management model. This is the only state that
unequivocally mandates one management model in preference to others. COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 7-80-401 (West Supp. 1993). The North Dakota statute can also be inter-
preted as mandating the election of a board of governors, but since the statute also says
that if the members desire to act by unanimous consent or vote, they do not need to have
governors, this is not entirely certain. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-69.1 (1994).
54. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.606 (West Supp. 1994) (management authority is vested
in a board of governors, unless the members agree to take the authority for themselves);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2014-2015 (West Supp. 1994); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
1528n, § 2.12 (West Supp. 1994).
55. The following cases discuss the degree of control held by general partners in the
context of determining whether partnership interests are securities: Goodwin v. Elkins &
Co., 730 F.2d 99, 107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d
212,215-16 (6th Cir. 1983); Frazier v. Manson, 651 F.2d 1078, 1081 (5th Cir. 1981); Slevin v.
Pedersen Assocs., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 437, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Elson v. Geiger, 506 F.
Supp. 238,243 (E.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 701 F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1982); Hirsch v. DuPont, 396
F. Supp. 1214, 1220-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977); New York Stock
Exch., Inc. v. Sloan, 394 F. Supp. 1303, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Oxford Fin. Cos., Inc. v.
Harvey, 385 F. Supp. 431, 433-34 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
Under this analysis, not even delegation of authority by general partners to a manag-
ing partner or committee will change the result. See, e.g., Sloan, 394 F. Supp. at 1314 ("The
fact that a partner may choose to delegate his day-to-day managerial responsibilities to a
committee does not diminish in the least his legal right to a voice in partnership matters,
nor his responsibility under state law for acts of the partnership." (citation omitted)).
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to delegate it might not be enough to change the fact that they have
the ultimate control. The critical issue is whether, and to what extent,
delegation of authority to managers divests each member of apparent
authority.56
The preceding discussion should suffice to indicate that an LLC
can have a wide range of management alternatives and at least pre-
serve the argument that it does not possess centralized management.
This characteristic, while important for a number of reasons, 57 does
not do much towards assuring uniformity.
The final corporate characteristic, free transferability of interests,
can also pose problems for LLCs desiring to be characterized as part-
nerships for tax purposes. Free transferability of interests requires
that substantially all owners have the power to transfer all attributes
of ownership, including the right to participate in management, with-
out obtaining consent from any other owner. 58 Corporations possess
this characteristic because state corporate statutes expressly allow
stockholders to convey all of their interest in corporate stock, unless
the shareholders have imposed advance restrictions on its transferabil-
ity. On the other hand, partnership statutes provide that an attempted
conveyance of a partnership interest results in no more than an assign-
ment of the right to receive distributions, unless all other partners
consent to the assignee becoming a substitute partner.
In the case of LLCs, the state statutes vary widely. Several state
statutes provide that a transferee of an LLC membership interest ac-
quires no rights to participate in the management of the LLC unless
and until all other members consent.59 Other statutes require less
than unanimous approval of transfers or permit the members to agree
to reduce the restrictions on transferability in the operating docu-
ments.60 The majority rule appears to require unanimous approval for
56. For an extended discussion of this issue, see infra notes 149-166 and accompanying
text.
57. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
58. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1)(as amended in 1993). Free transferability will not
exist if the member has the right to transfer only the right to participate in distributions
and not in management. See Rev. Rul. 77-137, 1977-1 C.B. 178.
59. ALA. CODE § 10-12-33 (Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-702 (West
Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.432 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
7618 (Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.313 (West Supp. 1994); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 21-2621 (Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.351 (Michie 1994); VA. CODE. ANN.
§ 13.1-1040 (Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-34 (Supp. 1994); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-122
(1989 & Supp. 1994).
60. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-731 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-706
(Michie Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-702 (1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-503
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the admission of new members unless the operating documents of the
LLC provide differently.
To retain the desirable classification as a partnership for tax pur-
poses, an LLC must possess certain specified characteristics regardless
of the flexibility in the state legislation. Unfortunately, the limitations
imposed by IRS regulations are not sufficient to support any single,
comprehensive description of all LLCs.
The fact that LLCs will vary between jurisdictions, and between
LLCs within the same jurisdiction, must be recognized and accepted.
This Article does not attempt to treat all LLCs as being equivalent.
Thus, a range of options as to each significant attribute of LLCs is
examined.
U. What Analysis Will Courts Likely Employ to Determine
if LLC Membership Interests Are Securities?
The two principal pieces of federal securities legislation-the Se-
curities Act of 1933 (the '33 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the '34 Act)-both contain lengthy definitions of the word "se-
curity. '' 61 The statutory definition of security is the obvious starting
(Harrison Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 53-638 (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/
30-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IND. CODE § 23-18-6-4(a)(Supp. 1994); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 490A.903 (West Supp. 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:1332 (West Supp. 1994); MD.
CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS § 4A-604(a) (1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4506(1)
(West Supp. 1994); Mo. REv. STAT. § 347.115 (1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-704
(1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:46 (Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-46 (West
Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-33 (Michie Repl. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-5-04
(1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-32 (1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2035 (West Supp.
1994); OR. REv. STAT. § 63.150 (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-36(a) (1992); S.D.
CODIFED LAWS ANN. § 47-34-21 (1994); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 4.07
(West Supp. 1994).
One statute adopts the default rule requiring unanimous acceptance of a new member,
but also provides that the parties cannot agree to new members by less than a majority
vote. UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-122 (1994). One statute requires only a majority vote of
remaining members, and even this is permissive. Connecticut Limited Liability Company
Act, 1993 Conn. Pub. Acts 93-267, § 38(a).
61. The '33 Act contains the following definition of "security," which follows the
phrase, "unless the context otherwise requires":
The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of de-
posit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas or other mineral rights,
any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit,
or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the
value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a
national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any inter-
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point for an analysis of whether LLC membership interests will be
classified as securities.
Both Acts contain lists of specific interests that are "securities,"
but neither purports to include a substantive definition applicable to
all such interests. Some of the listed interests have relatively well-
defined contours; others are relatively elastic and appear designed to
cover a broad spectrum of interests. Not surprisingly, LLC member-
ship interests, having been authorized for the first time in this country
more than four decades after Congress crafted the statutory definition
of "security" in the '33 and '34 Acts, are not included in the list of
interests covered by the legislation. There are, however, a number of
possible approaches that may be applied when examining the question
of how to classify LLC interests under the securities laws.
A. The Landreth Test-Ordinary Attributes of Stock
One possible approach, which has been urged by one commenta-
tor,62 is for the courts to equate LLC membership interests with stock.
In Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth,63 the Supreme Court considered
the circumstances under which a stock instrument would be treated as
a security under the federal securities laws. The Court determined
that an instrument bearing the "stock" label should be classified as a
security whenever it has the following ordinary attributes of stock: (1)
est or instrument commonly known as a 'security', or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988).
The '34 Act contains a similar definition. The '34 Act definition tracks the '33 Act,
but it includes, in addition to the items described in the '33 Act, certificates of interest or
participation in "any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease," rather than the '33 Act's
"fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)
(1988). The '34 Act also excludes from the definition of security "currency or any note,
draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance
of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the matur-
ity of which is likewise limited." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988). Notes, drafts, bills of ex-
change, or banker's acceptances generally meeting this description are exempted from the
registration provisions of the '33 Act under § 77c, but remain subject to the anti-fraud
provisions of that Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1987).
Despite these discrepancies, the statutes have been read in pari materia at least since
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (holding that a withdrawable capital share in a
state-chartered savings and loan association is a "security").
62. See Steinberg & Conway, supra note 17, at 1116 (suggesting that "because LLC
membership interests are issued by an entity called a 'Company' . . . substance should
prevail over form, thereby mandating that LLC interests be analyzed pursuant to the ordi-
nary attributes of stock standard").
63. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
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the right to receive profits based on the proportion of the owner's
interest in the entity; (2) the ability to vote in proportion to the inter-
est owned; (3) negotiability of the interest; (4) ability to pledge the
interest; and (5) the possibility that the interest will appreciate in
value. 64
The argument in favor of applying the ordinary attributes of stock
test to LLC membership interests is based on the similarities between
LLCs and corporations and between membership interests and stock.
This approach has some appeal since LLCs possess a number of char-
acteristics normally associated with corporations. LLCs are formed
by filing articles of organization, 65 a process which is analogous to the
requirement that a corporate charter be filed for corporations. In ad-
dition, the word "company," which has traditionally been associated
with corporations, must be included in the title of LLCs.66
64. Id. at 686 (citing United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975)).
65. See statutes cited supra note 30 (describing the formation of LLCs in a variety of
states).
66. Virtually all state statutes require a domestic LLC to include an affirmative indi-
cation that the entity being formed is a limited liability company. Most states require the
name of each LLC to reflect this by including the words "Limited Liability Company" or
some abbreviation, such as "LLC" or "LC" in the name of the LLC. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§ 10-12-5 (Supp. 1993); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-602.1 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 4-32-103 (Michie Supp. 1993); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-201(1) (West Supp. 1993);
Connecticut Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 Conn. Pub. Acts 93-267, § 3(a); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-102(1) (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.406 (West 1993 & Supp.
1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-207(a)(1) (Harrison Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 53-602(1)
(1994); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/1-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IND. CODE § 23-
18-1-8 (Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.401.1 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-706 (Supp. 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:1306 (West Supp. 1994); MD. CODE
ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 4A-208(a)(1) (1993); MrcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 450.4204 (West
Supp. 1994); Mo. REv. STAT. § 347.020 (1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.12.1(2) (West
Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-103 (1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2604 (Supp.
1993); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 86.171.1 (Michie 1994); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:3(I)
(Supp. 1993); NJ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-3 (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-
19-3 (Michie Repl. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-2-30 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-
10.1.13 (1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2008.1 (West Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 63.094 (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-9(a)(1) (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 47-34-2 (1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-106(1)(a) (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
1012.A (Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-5(a) (Supp. 1994).
Inclusion of the word "company" or an abbreviation thereof in the name of each LLC
appears to be the primary justification for the position of Professors Steinberg and Conway
that the Landreth test should apply to LLC membership interests. See Steinberg & Con-
way, supra note 17, at 1116.
In fact, not all states require the word "company" or any abbreviation thereof to ap-
pear in the name of a domestic LLC. See TEx. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n,
§ 203.A(1) (West Supp. 1994) (the name must include "Limited," "Ltd.," or "LLC"; and
Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-105 (1989 & Supp. 1994) (the name must include "Limited," "Ltd.," or
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At first glance, LLC membership interests do have many of the
ordinary attributes of stock. The default rules of most LLC statutes
provide that, if the articles of organization or operating agreement do
not provide for different allocations, members will share proportion-
ately in profits of the entity.67 Absent agreement to the contrary,
management rights in most jurisdictions are also allocated proportion-
ately.68 LLC statutes generally do allow assignment of each member's
right to receive distributions, 69 which might satisfy the requirement
that an interest must be capable of being negotiated and pledged in
order to qualify as stock. Finally, there is no doubt that the typical
LLC interest can appreciate in value. However, a more careful analy-
sis of these attributes indicates that LLC membership interests are re-
ally no more akin to stock than are partnership interests, which have
not been found to possess the ordinary attributes of stock.
With regard to the first element of the Landreth test, the question
is whether membership interests really convey the right to receive a
proportionate amount of profits in a manner akin to stock. It is true
that the default rules of most LLC statutes provide that, absent agree-
ment to the contrary, each member will be allocated profits and losses
in proportion to the value of their contribution to the LLC.70 Corpo-
"LLC"). Moreover, it is not at all clear that including "LLC" or "LC" in the name of an
LLC will trigger any association to the word "company," much less to a corporation.
67. See discussion infra note 70 and accompanying text.
68. See discussion infra notes 71-83. Note that even though "voting" rights in both
LLCs and corporations can be allocated "proportionately," this does not mean that they
will be essentially equivalent. The rights themselves may (and usually do) cover different
issues; also, the way in which the rights are to be exercised may be (and usually is)
different.
69. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
70. Most states provide that, absent agreement to the contrary, distributions will be
allocated on the basis of the value of each member's capital contribution or capital interest.
ALA. CODE § 10-12-28 (Supp. 1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-703 (Supp. 1993); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-504 (West Supp. 1993); Connecticut Limited Liability Company
Act, 1993 Conn. Pub. Acts 93-267, § 29; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-504 (1993); IND. CODE
§ 23-18-5-4 (Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.803 (West Supp. 1994); MD. CODE
ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-505 (1993); MIcH. CoMip. LAWS ANN. § 450.4304 (West Supp.
1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.50 (West Supp. 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:39
(Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-35 (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-23
(Michie Repl. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-4-03 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-60
(1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2025 (West Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-22
(1992); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 5.03 (West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 48-2b-129 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1030 (Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-25
(Supp. 1994).
A substantial number of states provide for equal allocation of distributions as a de-
fault rule. ARK. CODE ANN. §4-32-601 (Michie Supp. 1993); GA. CODE. ANN. § 14-11-403
(Harrison Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-629 (1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1324
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rate distributions are not allocated in quite this way. In the case of
ordinary stock, the right to receive distributions is not apportioned on
the basis of the value of the contribution, but on the number of shares
of stock acquired. For example, if investor A buys one share of X
corporation common stock for $1.00, and investor B buys one share of
the same stock but pays $10.00, B will not receive ten times the
amount distributed to A. Rather, A and B will receive equal distribu-
tions, since they own an equal number of shares.
Moreover, although the default rules for partnerships provide
that, absent agreement to the contrary, partners share equally in prof-
its and losses (after a return of initial contributions), many partner-
ships in fact allocate profits and losses in proportion to the value of
contributions, exactly as the default rules for most LLCs provide. In
addition, since both partnerships and LLCs must maintain detailed
capital accounts for all partners or members in order to comply with
the Internal Revenue Code, the manner in which profit and loss allo-
cations in LLCs will be structured will be the same as for partnerships.
This is not required for corporate distributions.
As to the second element of the Landreth test-the requirement
that voting be allocated proportionately-on close examination, LLC
membership interests are also quite distinct from corporate stock.
Shareholders have the right to vote on limited issues, such as the elec-
tion of directors and certain fundamental structural changes.71 More-
over, their voting rights are based on the number of voting shares
held, with each share in a class having the same number of votes.72
Even if the corporation issues multiple classes of stock-each having
different voting rights-the presumption in each state is that, absent a
provision to the contrary in the articles of incorporation, each share of
(West Supp. 1994); Mo. REv. STAT. § 347.109 (1993); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-601
(1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.195 (Supp. 1994).
There are also a nunfiber of states which provide only that distributions will be made in
accordance with the LLC's operating agreement or pursuant to a decision by those charged
with managing the LLC. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.444 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994);ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/25-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7615 (Supp.
1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2618 (Supp. 1993); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.341 (Michie
1994); S.D. CODnMED LAWS ANN. § 47-34-22 (1994); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-120 (1989 &
Supp. 1994).
71. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 28, § 188. "In a strict sense, management of
the business and affairs of a corporation is under the direction of its board of directors, and
shareholders have no functions of management as such." Id. at 490-91.
72. "Each share is usually entitled to one vote. .. ." Id. at 493.
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stock will have one vote, and in no case will shares of stock of the
same class have different voting rights.73
Participatory rights of members in LLCs, although they may be
"proportionate" in some sense, are not really equivalent to this type
of voting right. First, the types of issues upon which LLC members
are entitled to render decisions are very different from the types of
issues considered by corporate shareholders. In most states, absent a
contrary provision in the articles of organization or an operating
agreement, LLC members have the right to make all the day-to-day
management decisions.74 Even in those states where the default rule
provides that management authority will be vested in designated man-
agers-with the exception of Colorado and, possibly, North Dakota-
individual LLCs can still elect to opt out of this management model
and have direct member-management. This model gives members far
greater control than shareholders can aspire to, at least in their capaci-
ties as shareholders.75
Although LLC members have control over a far greater range of
decisions, in many states this power need not be exercised by "voting"
73. Actually, this last statement is no longer completely accurate. One of the more
inventive anti-takeover defenses of recent years has been the issuance of stock having vari-
able voting rights. Such stock contains equal voting rights, unless and until a particular
stockholder acquires more than a minimum threshold of the outstanding shares. In that
event, shares held by such shareholder cease to have voting rights, with the result that not
all shares of the same class have equal voting rights. See Baker v. Providence & Worcester
Co., 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977).
The SEC attempted to prevent companies from taking steps to nullify, restrict, or
disparately reduce the per share votes of existing shareholders by adopting Rule 19c-4
under the '34 Act. Voting Rights Listing Standards - Disenfranchisement Rule, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-25891, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,376 (July 12, 1988). The Business
Roundtable challenged the SEC's authority to promulgate this rule, and in Business
Roundtable v. SEC, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,291 (June 12, 1990), the court invalidated it.
The NYSE and NASDAQ, however, voluntarily adopted the essence of Rule 19c-4, and the
AMEX also took action to limit disenfranchisement of existing shareholders. None of
these actions, however, precludes the sale of new classes of shares with such restrictions.
In fact, in a few jurisdictions, this result is imposed by statute. E.g., IND. CODE § 23-1-
42-9 (Supp. 1994); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2561-2568 (1993). Under these provisions, any
time a shareholder acquires "control shares," such shares lose any voting rights. For exam-
ple, under the Indiana statute, control shares are defined as shares that, but for the opera-
tion of the Act, would bring the acquirer's voting control to or above any of three
thresholds: 20%, 33 1/3%, or 50%. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-4(a) (Supp. 1994).
Even in this situation, however, all shares of stock in the class must be subject to the
same restriction, so that if any shareholder exceeds the threshold, the same loss of voting
power is triggered.
74. See statutes cited supra note 27.
75. Shareholders can, of course, be elected to serve as directors. In this case, how-
ever, their voting power derives not from their status as shareholders, but from the fact
that they have been elected to serve as directors.
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in any formal sense. Several LLC statutes provide that decisions by
members can be reached by voting, approval, or consent to a particu-
lar course of action.76 Other statutes suggest that a vote will not be
necessary in other ways.77 Still other LLC statutes fail to mention or
discuss voting by members at all.78
Finally, even assuming that the power to make decisions or the
right to approve them is the same as "voting" power, and assuming
that the difference in the type of issues considered is not significant,
there is yet another distinction between the participatory rights of
members in an LLC and the rights of shareholders in a corporation.
As mentioned earlier, corporate shareholders derive voting power
from the number of shares owned. The consideration paid for stock is
totally irrelevant in calculating the voting power of those shares.
In the case of LLC membership interests, the "voting" or man-
agement power of a particular interest may depend on a number of
things. Although virtually all of the state LLC statutes permit the par-
ties to apportion voting power in any way they choose, the statutes
provide a default rule for allocating power. Some statutes have a de-
fault rule apportioning participatory rights on the basis of the value of
property contributed;79 other statutes give members equal voting
76. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-681.C (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-403
(Michie Supp. 1993); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-706 (West Supp. 1993); IND. CODE
§ 23-18-4-1(b)(1) (Supp. 1994).
77. For example, Delaware specifies that the operating agreement can provide that
no vote is needed and also offers suggested issues that might be included in an operating
agreement if an LLC desires to require member votes. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-302
(1993). Florida does not specify that any voting is required but does say that any mecha-
nism for deciding issues can be included in the LLC's regulations (the same as an operating
agreement). FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.422 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994). In Illinois, the statute
provides that all decisions by members shall "be made by concurrence." No formal vote is
mandated. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/10-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994).
78. E.g., NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 86-291 (Michie 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-
125 (1994); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-116 (1989 & Supp. 1994) (all describing management pow-
ers without discussing any requirement for voting).
79. In fact, most state LLC statutes provide that, in the absence of contrary agree-
ment, members in an LLC will have voting rights proportionate to their investment in the
LLC. The way in which the relative value of their investment is calculated varies from
state to state, with some states considering book value or agreed value of contributions and
others looking at the relative rights to share in profits. The following states have a default
rule granting proportionate voting rights: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (1993); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 608.422 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/10-5
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IND. CODE § 23-18-4-3 (Supp. 1994); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 490A.701 (West Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CoRps. & Ass'Ns § 4A-403 (1993); MICH.
Comp. LAWS ANN. § 450.4502 (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.356.2 (West
Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-403 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-1782 (Supp.
1993); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 86.291 (Michie 1994); N.L STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-27 (West
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power.80 This, of course, is subject to a contrary provision in the arti-
cles of organization or an operating agreement. In some jurisdictions,
the participatory rights of LLC membership interests are totally de-
pendent upon the agreement of the parties.81 By contrast to stock
rights, there is no single way in which voting rights are apportioned.
Moreover, all of the default rules discussed above differ substantially
from the allocation of stockholders' voting rights.
The voting rights of LLC members are more akin to partnership
voting rights than to those of shareholders in a corporation. In some
states, the default rule is exactly like the default rule provided for
partnerships-all owners have equal management rights.8 2 Even in
those states where voting rights are allocated based on the value of
capital contributions, this allocation of power is very common in part-
nerships and is quite distinct from the calculation of shareholder vot-
ing power.8 3
In LLCs where the members have delegated management au-
thority to one or more managers, the residual authority retained by
members is closer to the limited scope of authority granted to corpo-
rate shareholders. However, participatory rights of LLC members are
still different from the rights of stockholders in that most LLC statutes
Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-17 (Michie Repl. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-
45.2 (1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2020(a) (West Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-
21 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-34-16 (1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125
(1994); VA. CODE. ANN. § 13.1-1022 (Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-18 (Supp.
1994); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-116 (1989 & Supp. 1994).
80. A substantial number of LLC statutes have opted for per capita voting as the
default rule, with each member having an equal say in LLC decisions. See ALA. CODE
§ 10-12-22(b)(1) (Supp. 1993) (providing that any managers are to be elected by one-half
of the members-no other voting discussed); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-681.E (Supp.
1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-403 (Michie Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-
708 (West Supp. 1993); Connecticut Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 Conn. Pub. Acts
93-267, § 23(a); IDAHO CODE § 53-623 (1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (Supp. 1993);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1318 (West Supp. 1994); Mo. REV. STAT. § 347.079.4 (1993);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §304-C:24(V) (Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-20 (1993);
OR. REV. STAT. § 63.150 (Supp. 1994) (providing that, as a default rule, members will act
as managers and that managers each have one vote).
81. This is the case, for example, in Texas. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1568n,
§ 4.02 (West Supp. 1994).
82. See statutes cited supra note 27.
83. This is not to say, of course, that no LLC will ever elect to allocate voting rights in
a manner which is essentially the same as for corporate stockholders. For example, if an
LLC was to adopt an operating agreement providing that membership interests would be
sold in units at a price to be set by either the existing members or managers and that each
unit of membership interest would have one vote, this would look exactly like stock in
respect to how the votes per member are to be calculated.
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do not give members the right to demand a formal vote, and the way
in which such rights are apportioned is also different.
With regard to the third element of Landreth-negotiability and
the right to pledge the interests-it is probably not accurate to con-
clude that LLC membership interests are completely negotiable. Ne-
gotiability implies the right to transfer all attributes of ownership, not
merely the right to share in distributions. Absent agreement to the
contrary, a stockholder can transfer his or her shares and convey to
the transferee all of the transferor's rights in the corporation without
any additional act or agreement by the other stockholders. This con-
trasts starkly with the transferability restrictions imposed under both
partnership law and LLC statutes. Similar to partnership interests,
LLC interests can be assigned. However, under the LLC statutes the
transferee does not thereby acquire the right to participate in manage-
ment of the entity.84 Rather, the transferee's interest is limited to the
right to receive allocations and distributions. This is analogous to the
rules governing transferability of partnership interests, which are not
examined under the securities laws under the same approach used for
evaluating stock.
A similar limitation applies with regard to the fourth element of
Landreth-the right to pledge the interest. LLC interests, in exactly
the same manner as partnership interests, may be pledged to the ex-
tent of any right to receive distributions. Unlike stock, however, the
pledgee acquires no rights to become a substitute owner with rights to
participate in control of the entity upon default of the pledgor.85
Again, this characteristic is like that of partnership interests rather
than stock.
In certain respects, this detailed analysis of whether the similarity
between LLC interests and stock justifies the imposition of the Lan-
dreth test obscures what is perhaps the fundamental difference be-
tween LLC membership interests and stock. The Landreth Court
specified that the test it enunciated applied to interests that were la-
beled "stock." LLC membership interests are not called stock in any
of the statutes. While it is conceivable that an LLC might issue a doc-
ument bearing such a label to members to document their member-
ship interests, there is no reason for this to happen, and well-advised
LLCs will almost certainly not do so. Most membership interests are
likely to be called just that-membership interests-and, as such,
84. See discussion supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
85. The pledgee obtains no greater rights than any other assignee.
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there is no real reason why courts ought to ignore this essential ele-
ment of the Landreth test.86 After all, Landreth is based to a large
extent on the notion that "stock" is expressly included in the laundry
list of items that are to be treated as securities. That statutory lan-
guage ought to be respected so that anything which is called stock-
and really is stock-is covered by the legislation. There is nothing in
the language of either the '33 or '34 Acts to indicate that LLC mem-
bership interests should be treated as stock and subjected to the broad
analysis of the Landreth test.
B. Partnership Analysis
Another possibility is that LLC membership interests could be
analogized to partnership interests and, therefore, treated as securities
under the same circumstances as are partnership interests. As dis-
cussed, many LLCs have more characteristics in common with part-
nerships than with corporations. LLCs are formed when two or more
persons associate with one another to act as co-owners of a business
for the purpose of sharing profits.8 7 Although this is the classic defini-
tion of a partnership, generally speaking these are also characteristics
of corporations. Thus, the fact that an LLC would fit within the classic
definition of partnership is not particularly helpful in determining
whether LLC membership interests should be analogized to partner-
ship interests rather than to stock, or if some other analysis should be
employed.
Most legal authority on the issue is found in the area of federal
taxation. Because the tax classification of LLCs has been of such im-
86. Even if an LLC membership interest is evidenced by a certificate mistakenly la-
belled "stock," the analysis employed in this Section suggests that, in fact, the interest is
not "stock" and should not be treated as such under the securities laws.
87. In fact, absent enabling legislation that recognizes LLCs as a separate legal entity,
there is an extremely good argument that LLCs would in fact be partnerships.
Under the Uniform Partnership Act (U.P.A.), "[a] partnership is an association of two
or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." 6 U.L.A. 22 (1969). An
LLC would appear to fit within this definition. Moreover, U.P.A. § 7(4) provides that,
with certain exceptions not likely to be relevant in the case of most LLCs, the receipt of a
share of profits is prima facie evidence that the recipient is a partner. 6 U.L.A. 39 (1969).
Since members in LLCs are almost certain to expect a share of profits, there is likely to be
prima facie evidence of a partnership.
The one exception to this analysis would be single-member LLCs, which are appar-
ently authorized in both Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN § 4-32-201 (Michie Supp. 1993), and
Texas, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 2.09 (West. Supp. 1994). Single member
LLCs will not be addressed in any detail in this Article since they are authorized in only
two states, are unlikely to be particularly popular, and are not likely to give rise to any
securities issues.
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portance, there is a relatively well-established approach for determin-
ing whether LLCs should be considered to be more like partnerships
or corporations. Under the current Treasury regulations, in order to
be classified as a partnership for federal tax purposes, LLCs must
avoid at least two of these three corporate characteristics: (1) con-
tinuity of life apart from their members; (2) centralized management;
and/or (3) free transferability of the membership interests.88 It is pos-
sible for an LLC to avoid all three of these attributes, making an LLC
much more akin to a partnership than to a corporation, at least for tax
purposes. As long as LLCs have no more than one of these "corpo-
rate characteristics," they are classified as partnerships for purposes of
federal taxation. There would be a certain symmetry to treating them
as partnerships under the federal securities laws as well.
Conceding that LLCs, in many respects, are like partnerships,
and assuming that membership interests should be treated as securi-
ties under the same circumstances as are partnership interests, raises
the question of when partnership interests should be treated as securi-
ties. Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the question of
when partnership interests are to be classified as securities under the
'33 and '34 Act, a number of federal courts and commentators have.
The earlier cases draw a distinction between general partnership inter-
ests and limited partnership interests.8 9 The former were generally
held not to be securities, while the latter were generally characterized
as securities subject to the provisions of the '33 and '34 Act. More
recent cases, including the opinion of the Fifth Circuit in Williamson v.
88. See discussion supra notes 36-60 and accompanying text.
89. The cases cited supra note 55 also stand for the proposition that because general
partners do not depend solely on others for their profits, general partnership interests are
generally not securities. While this is the general rule, there are certainly exceptions to
this, and some general partnership interests will be securities. See infra notes 90-93 and
accompanying text.
Similarly, limited partners do depend solely on the efforts of others for their share of
profits, so limited partnership interests have generally been characterized as securities. See
Mayer v. Oil Field Sys. Corp., 721 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1983); SEC v. Holschuh, 694 F.2d 130,
137 (7th Cir. 1982); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 640 (9th Cir. 1980); Goodman v. Epstein,
582 F.2d 388, 408-09 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979); Hirsch v. DuPont,
396 F. Supp. 1214, 1227-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977).
This is also not without exception. Some limited partnership interests have been
found not to be securities by virtue of special factors showing involvement of limited part-
ners in management. See Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse
Assocs., 595 F. Supp. 800,805-07 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Frazier v. Manson, 484 F. Supp. 449,450-
53 (N.D. Tex. 1980), affd, 651 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1981).
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Tucker,90 have included analysis that is more sophisticated than
merely distinguishing between general and limited partnerships.
In Williamson, the Fifth Circuit held that while general partner-
ship interests typically will not be securities, a general partner might
prevail in a securities action upon a showing that he was so dependent
on the promoter or a third party that he was, in fact, unable to exer-
cise meaningful partnership powers.91 The court offered three exam-
ples in which a general partnership interest might properly be
classified as a security:
(1) an agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the
hands of the partner or venturer that the arrangement in fact dis-
tributes power as would a limited partnership; or (2) the partner or
venturer is so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business af-
fairs that he is incapable of intelligently exercising his partnership or
venture powers; or (3) the partner or venturer is so dependent on
some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the promoter
or manager that he cannot replace the manager of the enterprise or
otherwise exercise meaningful partnership or venture powers.92
Cases that apply this analysis, however, generally conclude that the
general partnership interests under consideration are not properly
characterized as securities.93 Only in very unusual circumstances will
a general partner be able to overcome the presumption that a general
partnership interest is not a security.94
The difference between treatment of general and limited partner-
ship interests highlights one of the most significant attributes of LLC
membership interests-that they may or may not include management
rights. General partners, by statute, have the right to participate in
90. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). For additional discussion
of Williamson, see Leslie J. Levinson, General Partnership Interests and the Securities Act of
1933: Recent Judicial Developments, 10 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 463 (1983); Marc H. Morgen-
stern, Real Estate Joint Venture Interests as Securities: The Implications of Williamson v.
Tucker, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 1231 (1982); Douglas M. Fried, Comment, General Partnership
Interests as Securities Under the Federal Securities Laws: Substance Over Form, 54 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 303 (1985).
91. 645 F.2d at 422.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Reeves v. Teuscher, 881 F.2d 1495, 1499-1500 (9th Cir. 1989); Rivanna
Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 240-41 (4th Cir. 1988);
Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984);
Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 1983); Casablanca Prod., Inc. v. Pace Int'l
Research, Inc. 697 F. Supp. 1563, 1567 (D. Or. 1988); Power Petroleum Inc. v. P & G
Mining Co., 682 F. Supp. 492, 494 (D. Colo. 1988).
94. See, e.g., Stone v. Kirk, 8 F.3d 1079 (6th Cir. 1993); SEC v. Professional Assoc.,
731 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1984).
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the management and control of their partnership. 95 Even if they
choose to delegate most of that authority to a managing partner or
committee, they have the power to manage. Further, even if they
delegate actual authority, they retain apparent authority to bind the
partnership in the ordinary course of partnership operations. 96 On the
other hand, limited partners are statutorily precluded from exercising
excessive control over their partnerships97 and face the possibility of
losing the protection of limited liability if they exercise substantial
control.98 Generally speaking, it is this distinction that has resulted in
limited partnership interests typically being classified as securities
while general partnership interests typically are not. In this regard,
LLC membership interests are not precisely like general partnership
interests or limited partnership interests, although in some respects
they will look more like one than the other.
In most states, the LLC statutes create a presumption, absent
contrary agreement by the parties, that members will participate in
the management of the LLC. There is certainly no statutory penalty
attached to their participation in management, as is the case with lim-
ited partners who exercise control. This is not to say, of course, that
members might not by agreement cede so much of their authority that
in a given case the members in the LLC look more like limited part-
ners insofar as their management rights are concerned. To some ex-
tent this is also possible in general partnerships.
On the other hand, there is also a significant distinction between
the authority of general partners and the authority of members in an
LLC. Generally, under the UPA, general partners cannot divest them-
selves of apparent authority by agreement. 99 By contrast LLC mem-
bers in most states can cede both actual and apparent authority by
95. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969); REv. UNIF. LTD.
PARTNERSHIP Acr § 403(a), 6 U.L.A. 465 (Supp. 1994).
96. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (as amended in 1993) (describing authority to
make management decisions).
97. In actuality, limited partners did have the right to inspect records and to seek an
accounting even under the U.L.P.A. section 7. 6 U.L.A. 582 (1969). Moreover, under the
R.U.L.P.A., limited partners have extensive participatory rights, including the right to act
as an officer, director, or shareholder of a corporate general partner. REv. UNIF. LTD.
PARTNERSHIP Acr § 303(b), 6 U.L.A. 442-43 (Supp. 1994).
98. UNrF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 7, 6 U.L.A. 582 (1969) (providing that limited
partners who assume excessive control will have unlimited personal liability thereafter);
REv. UNIP. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 303, 6 U.L.A. 442-43 (Supp. 1994) (providing that
limited partners who assume excessive control will have unlimited personal liability as to
persons who deal with the limited partnership believing the limited partner to be a general
partner).
99. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 9(1), 6 U.L.A. 132 (1969).
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agreeing in their articles of organization or operating agreement to
allow managers to exercise day-to-day control.1 °
Though hard to classify, the management structure of LLCs is
best divided into three categories: member-managed LLCs, manager-
managed LLCs, and LLCs with hybrid management. For member-
managed LLCs, the closest parallel is clearly the general partnership
where management duties are shared by the partners. 1°1 Manager-
managed LLCs are likely to be more akin to the limited partnership,
although it is certainly possible to conceive of a manager-managed
LLC that operates more like a general partnership,1 and there are
differences between manager-managed LLCs and limited partner-
ships.103 The hybrid management model would permit delegation of
actual authority to managers while allowing members to retain appar-
ent authority to bind the LLC to ordinary business acts.1°4 Because it
is difficult to determine whether some LLCs are more like general or
limited partnerships, the application of the Williamson test in the con-
text of LLCs is complicated.
Under Williamson10 5 and its progeny, general partnership inter-
ests will be classified as securities only after a presumption to the con-
trary has been overcome by showing that the arrangement is really
like a limited partnership despite its nomenclature. 0 6 In order to ap-
ply this test to LLCs, a preliminary determination must be made as to
100. See supra note 27; see also discussion infra notes 150-166 and accompanying text.
101. This seems to be quite clear. Member-managed LLCs are analogous to general
partnerships in that all owners have both actual and apparent authority. In no other form
of business entity is this the case.
102. For example, an LLC can be formed as a manager-managed operation, but with
the affirmative requirement that all members be elected to serve as the managers. While
this seems unduly cumbersome, it is entirely possible that this structure will be utilized,
particularly in jurisdictions like Colorado, which requires management of the LLC to be
vested in one or more managers. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-401 (West Supp. 1993).
In such jurisdictions, the only hope of avoiding the corporate characteristic of centralized
management would be to adopt a scheme whereby all members become managers auto-
matically by virtue of their status as members. This may not be possible in Colorado since
the statute also seems to require election of the managers. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-
402 (West Supp. 1993).
103. The biggest difference is that members in LLCs do not face any statutory penalty
for participating in management and control, but there is also the possibility that the ap-
parent authority of members will be far different from that of limited partners.
104. See infra notes 150-166 and accompanying text.
105. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
106. This is the first of the three examples offered by the court in Williamson. Any
time the agreement "leaves so little power in the hands of the partner.., that the arrange-
ment in fact distributes power as would a limited partnership" the interest should be classi-
fied as a security. Id. at 424.
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whether the LLC in question is more akin to a general partnership or
to a limited partnership. In the case of LLCs more akin to general
partnerships, the presumption that membership interests are not se-
curities would be triggered, but could be overcome by any of the three
approaches outlined in Williamson. LLCs that are more akin to lim-
ited partnerships would probably be treated as securities.
Application of the partnership analysis to LLC membership in-
terests is complicated by the fact that LLCs are not required to be like
either general or limited partnerships, and may, in fact, be more like a
combination of the two entities. Although the partnership analysis
can be stretched to apply to LLCs, under state law, LLCs are neither
general nor limited partnerships. 0 7 They are a new form of entity
which represent a blending of the characteristics of general partner-
ships, limited partnerships, and corporations.
While treating LLC membership interests like general partner-
ship interests would probably not offend anyone's sensibilities, there
are other alternatives that do not require stretching the Williamson
test beyond its intended boundaries. LLC interests may be examined
in order to see whether they qualify as "investment contracts"-a
catch-all category that was intended to prevent promoters from avoid-
ing application of the securities laws by creating novel and creative
interests. 08
Before turning to an analysis of whether LLC membership inter-
ests qualify as investment contracts, however, there is one other possi-
ble approach that deserves consideration.
C. The Family Resemblance Test
One of the specific categories of interests covered by the '33 and
'34 Acts, albeit to a slightly different extent, is promissory notes.
Although included in the list of "securities," there is virtually univer-
107. The fact that they may be taxed as partnerships under either a state or federal
taxation scheme is no more than a recognition that all unincorporated associations are
taxed as either corporations or partnerships, not that no other business form exists.
108. Some of the cases and commentators who address the proper classification of
partnership interests under the federal securities laws have indicated that the proper reso-
lution of this issue requires no more than an analysis of the investment contract test. See,
e.g., Dennis S. Kajala, Federalism, Full Disclosure, and the National Markets in the Inter-
pretation of Federal Securities Law, 80 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 1473, 1511 n.156 (1986) (noting that
Williamson has been used by many courts as a basis for finding "no investment contract as
a matter of law .... ."). However, the Williamson test seems to have a different focus from
the Howey investment contract analysis; thus, I have examined these rules separately in
this Article.
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sal agreement that not all notes should be considered securities, 1 9
rendering the literal approach that has prevailed in interpreting the
meaning of the word "stock" inappropriate. After years of heated de-
bate among the federal circuits, 110 the Supreme Court finally adopted
the "family resemblance" test to determine whether a note should be
classified as a security.
While it should be clear that an LLC membership interest has far
more in common with a general partnership interest than with any
promissory note, at least one commentator has suggested that the
family resemblance test encompasses "the determination whether
LLC interests are securities.""' Thus, before considering the invest-
ment contract analysis, which was originally intended to be broad-
based, one must examine the family resemblance test to determine its
applicability to LLC membership interests.
The Supreme Court relied on the family resemblance test to de-
termine the proper classification of promissory notes under the fed-
eral securities laws in Reves v. Ernst & Young.1 2 In Reves, the Court
held that promissory notes are presumptively securities, unless the
note in question bears a strong family resemblance to other notes that
are recognized as being something other than securities." 3 To deter-
109. Quite reasonably, courts and commentators generally have been unwilling to find
that notes arising out of home mortgages, consumer installment sales, and ordinary com-
mercial financing are to be classified as securities subject to the registration requirements
of the federal securities laws. As one court explained: "If it had been intended, in legisla-
tion entitled the 'Securities Exchange Act,' to extend federal jurisdiction to transactions of
this type, Congress most certainly would have given a real indication of such intent." Lino
v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 695 (3d Cir. 1973).
110. Before the Supreme Court answered the question, the lower federal courts had
developed a number of conflicting approaches for determining when a note counted as a
security under the federal securities laws. The Second Circuit had adopted a "family re-
semblance" test. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126,
1137-38 (2d Cir. 1976). The Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the
Seventh Circuit, and the Fifth Circuit have applied the commercial/investment approach.
See Bauer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1981); American Fletcher
Mortgage Co. v. U. S. Steel Credit Corp., 635 F.2d 1247, 1253-54 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 911 (1980); United Am. Bank v. Gunter, 620 F.2d 1108, 1116-1118 (5th Cir. 1980).
111. Steinberg & Conway, supra note 17, at 1121.
112. 494 U.S. 56, 64-67 (1990).
113. By way of example, Judge Friendly listed the following types of notes that would
not be classified as securities: "the note delivered in consumer financing, the note secured
by a mortgage on a home, the short-term note secured by a lien on a small business or
some of its assets, the note evidencing a 'character' loan to a bank customer, short-term
notes secured by an assignment of accounts receivable, or a note which simply formalizes
an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course of business .... Exchange Nat'l
Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137-38 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 884 (1984).
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mine when a note bears such a family resemblance, the Court set out a
four-part test. The test requires courts to examine: (1) the motivations
of a reasonable buyer and seller of such notes; (2) the plan of distribu-
tion of the instrument; (3) the reasonable expectations of the public;
and (4) whether some other factor, such as the existence of another
regulatory scheme, sufficiently protects investors." 4
It seems relatively easy to apply the first factor to LLCs. As to
the motives of the buyer and seller, the Supreme Court in Reves indi-
cated that "[i]f the seller's purpose is to raise money for the general
use of a business enterprise... the instrument is likely to be a secur-
ity."'1 5 Most LLC members are likely to make monetary contribu-
tions toward the LLC's general operations. Only in limited situations
would an LLC issue membership interests in order to finance particu-
lar transactions rather than general operations. Non-monetary contri-
butions might be made in a number of situations, but the most
common investment in LLCs is likely to be a cash contribution. Thus,
as to this element, most LLC membership interests will likely look
like securities.
As to the other elements of the Reves test, however, it is unclear
how LLC membership interests should be analyzed. The second ele-
ment of the family resemblance test requires that in order to be classi-
fied as a security, the interest should be expected to be traded for
speculation or investment." 6 Since LLC membership interests typi-
cally will be structured to avoid free transferability, this element
would appear to be lacking. However, in Reves itself, the demand
notes, which were found to satisfy this criteria, could not be traded." 7
According to the Court, it was enough that they were "offered and
sold to a broad segment of the public."" 8 Applying this analysis to
LLC membership interests, they may be found to satisfy the second
element even though they are not freely tradeable since there is noth-
ing in the LLC statutes to prevent the LLC from issuing interests to a
114. Reves, 494 U.S. at 66-67.
115. Id at 66.
116. Id (citing SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943)).
117. Id. at 68.
118. Id. It has been pointed out that this interpretation is inherently self-contradictory
because the family resemblance test excludes such interests as residential mortgage loans
and consumer finance loans, both of which are, in fact, the subject of significant speculative
trading. See Gary B. Gorton & Joseph G. Haubrich, The Loan Sales Market, in 2 RE-
SEARCH IN FINANCIAL SERVICEs 89 (G. Kaufman ed., 1990).
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"broad segment of the public" upon the agreement of existing
members.119
The distinction between the demand notes in Reves and LLC
membership interests is that there is no statute restricting free trans-
ferability of notes. The LLC statutes do limit transferability of LLC
membership interests absent a less restrictive provision in an operat-
ing agreement and generally require unanimous consent of all mem-
bers to the transfer of membership interests. 20 Thus, it is hard to say
whether LLC membership interests would satisfy the requirement of
common trading which is the second element of the Reves test.
Similarly, as to the third element-the reasonable expectation of
the purchasers-it is hard to say what investors in LLCs will expect. It
has been argued, principally on the basis of the fact that LLCs must
have the word "company" in their name,' 2 ' that members are likely to
regard their LLC membership interests as being the equivalent of
stock, thus making them subject to the protection of the federal secur-
ities laws.122 On the other hand, it has also been suggested that LLCs
have been viewed and organized principally as a replacement for gen-
eral partnerships. 23 If viewed in this light, investors might not expect
the securities laws to apply to their purchases, since general partner-
ship interests are generally not classified as securities. 24
Because LLCs are so new, it is impossible to say definitively how
LLC membership interests are presently regarded, or how they will be
regarded in the future. This makes it extremely difficult to apply the
third element of the Reves test to LLC membership interests.
The final element of the Reves test asks if there is some other
reason, such as the existence of an alternative regulatory scheme,
which reduces the risk of the investment. While it is not clear that
119. Of course, if membership interests in an LLC become publicly traded, this may
result in the LLC being classified as an association taxable as a corporation under the
Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 7704(a) (1989) (stating that a publicly traded partner-
ship will be taxed as a corporation unless 90% or more of its income is passive).
120. See statutes cited supra note 59. In the unlikely event that LLC members agree to
free transferability, this analysis would be much simpler. However since such an election is
unlikely given the tax consequences of free transferability, the determination of whether a
particular LLC possesses this characteristic must be done on a case-by-case basis. For a
discussion of the tax consequences of free transferability, see supra notes 58-60 and accom-
panying text.
121. See statutes cited supra note 66.
122. Steinberg & Conway, supra note 17, at 1116, 1122.
123. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of
Partnerships, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (1992).
124. See supra notes 87-108 and accompanying text.
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such an alternative regulatory scheme exists, it is at least possible that
existing legislation and regulations may'25 provide investors in LLCs
with a measure of protection. There are two possible regulatory
schemes that may provide such protection. First, the various LLC
statutes offer investors substantial protection. Second, the Internal
Revenue Code imposes certain requirements that may protect
investors.
Given the variety in state LLC statutes, it is difficult to talk in
generalities. However, every state LLC statute provides some mea-
sure of protection to investors,126 although the protection vary consid-
erably from state to state. One of the most significant protection
offered by a number of state statutes is the right to inspect records. In
many states, members are entitled to inspect and copy a wide variety
of records, ranging from membership lists, operating agreements, and
tax returns to all relevant business information. 2 7 These statutory
125. The word "may" is used because of the substantial uncertainty that surrounds
existing tax regulations governing classification of LLCs as partnerships and because of the
extreme diversity of state legislation governing formation and operation of LLCs. For a
discussion concerning the uncertainty surrounding existing tax regulations, see supra notes
36-60 and accompanying text.
126. It can be argued that there is no more protection offered to LLC members by
virtue of the LLC statutes than to corporate shareholders by virtue of corporate statutes.
This argument, while quite valid, is nonetheless not relevant to analyzing how the Reves
test would apply to LLC membership interests. Stock is not considered to be a security
because it meets the four-part Reves test, including the lack of an alternate scheme of
regulation that makes application of the securities laws unimportant. Rather, stock is
treated as a security because it is included in the laundry list of items in both the '33 and
'34 Acts. Under Landreth, if an instrument called "stock" actually possesses the attributes
of stock, it will be a security regardless of whether there is really any need for the securities
laws to apply. 471 U.S. at 693-97. In fact, in Landreth, the Supreme Court rejected the
"sale of business" doctrine that lower courts had developed primarily as a way of avoiding
application of the securities laws to transactions in which the participants should not have
needed the protection of the securities laws. Id.
127. The majority of state LLC statutes contain mandatory record keeping require-
ments. ALA. CODE § 10-12-16 (Supp. 1993); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-607 (Supp.
1993); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-411 (West Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 53-625
(1994); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 18011-50 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IND. CODE § 23-
18-4-8 (Supp. 1994); IowA CODE ANN. § 490A.709 (West Supp. 1994); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 12:1319 (West Supp. 1994); MicH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 450.4213 (West Supp.
1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.373 (West Supp. 1994); Mo. REV. STAT. § 347.091 (1993);
NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 86.241 (Michie 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-19 (Michie Repl.
1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-04 (1993); N.D. CErr CODE § 10-32-51 (1994); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2021 (West Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.771 (Supp. 1994); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 7-16-22 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-34-11 (1994); TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 2.22 (West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-119 (1994);
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1028 (Michie 1993).
Kansas imposes a requirement that every LLC file an annual report containing de-
tailed information. Although it does not have to be kept by the LLC, this report would,
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rights to inspect and copy relevant records offer significant protection,
especially since the main focus of the federal securities laws is to guar-
antee access to information. 128
Another protection included in a number of statutes is the pre-
sumption that members will have management or agency authority
unless the articles of organization or an operating agreement provide
for delegation to managers.129 The presumption of management au-
thority for all members is a very significant power and protective de-
vice for potential members.130 Some of the LLC statutes also provide
that when authority is delegated to managers, the managers will have
certain specified duties and responsibilities.' 3' The statutory require-
ment that managers exercise their powers in good faith and for the
benefit of the company offers a measure of protection to potential
investors.
There are a variety of other protective provisions that appear in
some LLC statutes. For example, some of the statutes give members a
right to petition for involuntary dissolution in the event of fraud or
abuse of power. 132 However, most statutes limit this right to instances
where it is no longer practicable to carry on the business in accord-
presumably, be available to interested persons as a matter of public record. KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-7647 (Supp. 1993).
A few of the LLC statutes permit reasonable modification of the statutory record-
keeping requirements. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-305 (1993); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS.
& Ass'NS § 4A-406 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:28 (Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 42:2B-23 (West Supp. 1994). Other jurisdictions would apparently permit an LLC
to adopt rules negating any record-keeping obligation. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-405
(Michie Supp. 1993); Connecticut Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 Conn. Pub. Acts
93-267; GA. CODE. ANN. § 14-11-313 (Harrison Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-404
(1993). Nevada and West Virginia apparently have no reporting requirements, although
obviously any LLC is free to adopt such requirements by agreement.
128. See infra notes 222-229 and accompanying text.
129. See statutes cited supra note 27.
130. If the LLC is member-managed, members have the actual authority to make busi-
ness decisions for the LLC. This provides a significant degree of protection for members
because it effectively prevents them from being cut off from information about the day-to-
day activities of the LLC unless they do not wish to review such data. Even if the LLC has
designated managers, as long as members retain apparent authority to manage the LLC,
this protects members from being shut out of the decision-making loop because it would be
foolhardy to preclude a member with power to bind the LLC from having access to mate-
rial information.
131. IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.706 (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.663
(West Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2016 (West Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-1024.1 (Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-20 (Supp. 1994).
132. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-808 (West Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.448
(West 1993 & Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-643 (1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7629
(Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.833 (West Supp. 1994).
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ance with the operating agreement. 133 Most state statutes provide for
automatic dissolution in the event that any member resigns from the
LLC unless there is unanimous or at least majority agreement to con-
tinue the business, 134 although some states would apparently allow the
members to agree in advance to continue the LLC.135 All statutes
require the filing of articles of organization containing certain infor-
mation about the LLC, which then become a. matter of public record
available for inspection by potential members. 36
In fact, LLCs are a statutory creation that would not exist without
express authorization. While investor protection varies tremendously
under the statutes, it seems clear that the statutes in question provide
a degree of protection that is normally missing in the context of ordi-
nary promissory notes.137
133. ALA. CODE § 1-12-38 (Supp. 1993); ARiz REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-785 (Supp. 1993);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-902 (Michie Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802 (1993);
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-603 (Harrison Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.1302 (West
Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns § 4A-903 (1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 450.4802 (West Supp. 1994); Mo. REv. STAT. § 347.143 (1993); MoNT. CODE ANN.
§ 35-8-902 (1993); N.H. REv. STAT ANN. §§ 304-C:50, -C:51 (Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 42:2B-49 (West Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-40 (Michie Repl. 1993); VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-1047 (Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-36 (Supp. 1994).
134. ALA. CODE § 10-12037 (Supp. 1993); ARz REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-781 (Supp.
1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-901 (Michie Supp. 1993); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-
801 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-801 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.441
(West 1993 & Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-602 (Harrison Supp. 1994); IDAHO
CODE § 53-642 (1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.1301 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-7622 (Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns § 4A-901 (1993); MIcH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4801 (West Supp. 1994); Mo. REv. STAT. § 347.137 (1993); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 322B.80 (West Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-901 (1993); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 21-2622(3) (Supp. 1993); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 86.491 (Michie 1994); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 304C:50 (Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-48 (West Supp. 1994); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 53-19-39 (Michie Repl. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2037 (West Supp.
1994); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n., § 6.01 (West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 48-2b-137 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1046 (Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE § 31-
1A-35 (Supp. 1994); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-123 (1989 & Supp. 1994).
135. ARiz REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-781 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-901
(Michie Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-801 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.441
(West 1993 & Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7622 (Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-901 (1993); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n., § 6.01 (West
Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-137 (1994).
136. See statutes cited supra note 30. Admittedly, the information required to be in-
cluded in articles of organization in many jurisdictions is quite sparse.
137. By no means should the preceding discussion be taken as an exclusive listing of
the protective features in various state statutes. A number of state schemes have atypical
provisions that would act to protect members in those jurisdictions. For example, in Texas,
the statute provides that, absent agreement to the contrary in the LLC's internal regula-
tions, authority over day-to-day decisions will be vested in managers. However, since
members are given exclusive authority to amend the regulations at any time, the managers
In addition to the state regulatory structure, which is virtually im-
possible to discuss in detail without an involved examination of indi-
vidual statutory provisions, the Internal Revenue Code offers another
source of potential regulation that may inure to the benefit of LLC
members. As discussed earlier, LLCs derive much of their potential
attractiveness as an alternative form of business organization from the
fact that they can be classified as partnerships for tax purposes. 138 Be-
cause this classification is not automatic, the need to comply with reg-
ulatory requirements imposes certain limitations on LLCs. 139 As
discussed, current Treasury regulations permit an LLC to be classified
as a partnership for tax purposes only if the LLC has no more than
one of the following three characteristics: (1) continuity of life; (2)
centralization of management; and (3) free transferability of inter-
ests. 140 If any LLC has two of these three characteristics, 141 it will be
deemed to be more like a corporation than a partnership, and it will
lose its partnership tax status. In order to preserve this classification,
no LLC is likely to have both continuity of life and centralized man-
agement. Either of these alternatives provides some protection for
potential investors.
Because the analysis of what is required to avoid the corporate
characteristic of centralized management is more straight-forward,
and it is more obvious how this characteristic can protect investors, it
will be dealt with first. According to the regulations, centralized man-
agement refers to a "concentration of continuing exclusive authority"
to manage the entity without the approval of other members. 142 The
powers and authority of a corporate board of directors, for example,
are enough to satisfy this requirement. A general partnership, on the
other hand, typically lacks this characteristic since each partner has
the power to bind the partnership. 43 In addition, a limited partner-
ship typically lacks this characteristic so long as the general partner
could find themselves supplanted if the members adopt a member-management format.
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n., § 2.09 (West Supp. 1994).
138. See discussion supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 41-60 and accompanying text.
140. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 1993). Actually, the regulations spec-
ify that an unincorporated association will be classified as an association taxable as a cor-
poration whenever it possesses a majority of the following four characteristics: (1)
continuity of life; (2) centralization of management; (3) limited liability; and (4) free trans-
ferability of interests. See Rev. Rul. 79-106, 1979-1 C.B. 448.
141. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
142. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(3) (as amended in 1993).
143. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (as amended in 1993).
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owns a "meaningful proprietary interest" in the partnership. 144 Cor-
porations, therefore, possess the characteristic of centralized manage-
ment because management authority is divorced from ownership,
while general partnerships lack this characteristic, and limited partner-
ships can be structured so as to avoid centralized management.
LLCs are not so easily classified. The state LLC statutes contain
significant variations, and LLCs formed within a given state are likely
to have variations as great. The majority of LLC statutes provide that
members will manage the LLC, unless the members agree other-
wise.145 Some statutes provide that the LLC will be controlled by
managers unless the members agree otherwise, or even that the LLC
must be controlled by managers. 146 Member-managed LLCs will cer-
tainly lack the corporate characteristic of centralized management,
and this fact will likely mean that there is no reason for the securities
laws to be applied.' 47 As to manager-managed LLCs, it is difficult to
say whether members will be protected by virtue of the requirements
of the Internal Revenue Code, even if the LLC is structured so as to
avoid centralized management.
In order to have a manager-managed LLC that will lack central-
ized management, one of two things must happen. Either the LLC
must be akin to a general partnership with one or more managing
partners or a limited partnership that is structured so as to lack cen-
144. Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 176-79 (1976), acq. 1979-1 C.B. 1. It is clear
that if the limited partners own more than 94.3% of the total interest in the partnership,
they own substantially all of the partnership interest and the corporate characteristic of
centralized management would be present. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(2) (as amended in
1993) (example (1)). Moreover, if the limited partners' interests exceed 80% of the total
partnership interests, the IRS will not issue a ruling that a limited partnership lacks the
characteristic of centralized management. Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798-801.
Additionally, in order to insure that the general partner has a substantial interest in
the partnership, the limited partners cannot have an unrestricted right to remove the gen-
eral partner. See, e.g., Zuckerman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729, 735 (Cl. Ct. 1975); Lar-
son, 66 T.C. at 176-79.
145. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.422 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612
(Supp. 1993); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 86.291 (Michie 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-
125 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1022 (Michie 1993).
146. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-401 (West Supp. 1993). The members may be
managers; however, this is no different from corporate directors, who may also be share-
holders. The North Dakota statute can also be interpreted as mandating the election of a
board of governors. However, this is not entirely certain since the statute also says that if
the members desire to act by unanimous consent or vote they do not need to have gover-
nors. N.D. CENT. CODE. § 10-32-69.1 (1994).
147. A member with management authority has both actual and apparent authority to
bind the company to transactions entered into in the ordinary course of business. This
authority obviates the need for the special protection of the securities laws, which are
designed primarily to protect passive investors by providing access to information.
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tralized management. In general partnerships, the appointment of
one or more managing partners will not result in centralization of
management since there is no way for the other partners to effectively
divest themselves of apparent authority.148 A manager-managed LLC
would, therefore, be equivalent to a general partnership with one or
more managing partners if the LLC members retained apparent au-
thority to bind the entity to certain transactions. This management
model is actually a hybrid between member-management and man-
ager-management and, to avoid confusion, will generally be referred
to as hybrid-management in this Article. Determining which manage-
ment model exists may be quite difficult in a number of situations.
First, most state statutes appear to bifurcate the apparent author-
ity of members, providing that members in member-managed LLCs
have all management authority, while in manager-managed LLCs,
such authority is vested in managers. 149 Some state statutes simply
provide that management will be vested exclusively in the members
unless the members have placed managers in control. 150 Many state
statutes do not expressly address the apparent authority of LLC mem-
148.
[Blecause of the mutual agency relationship between members of a general
partnership subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform Partnership Act,
such a general partnership cannot achieve effective concentration of management
powers .... [E]ven if the partners agree among themselves that the powers of
management shall be exclusively in a selected few, this agreement will be ineffec-
tive as against an outsider who had no notice of it.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4)(as amended in 1993).
149. For a list of statutory provisions adopting either member-management or man-
ager-management as the default model, see statutes cited supra note 27.
150. For example, the Arizona statute provides that management is vested in the mem-
bers unless the articles of organization provide otherwise. However, this is somehow sub-
ject to the operating agreement as well. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-681. A (Supp. 1993).
The Delaware statute specifies that management is in members except as otherwise pro-
vided by agreement, in which case management is in managers to the extent so vested.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (1993). The Iowa LLC Act says that management is in the
members unless the articles or the operating agreement provide otherwise. IOWA CODE
ANN. § 490A.702 (West Supp. 1994). See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (Supp. 1993)
(stating that management is in the members except if the articles or the operating agree-
ment so provides; if it so provides, then management may be vested in managers); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125 (Supp. 1994) (stating that management is in members unless man-
agers are designated in the articles; this provision addresses apparent authority as well);
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1022 (Michie 1993) (stating that management is in members, except
as provided in articles or operating agreement).
The opposite rule appears in some states with manager-management as the default
rule. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.606 (West Supp. 1994) (stating that management is in the
board of governors except that members may choose to act on unanimous vote); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2013 (West Supp. 1994) (stating that management is vested in manag-
ers except as provided in articles or operating agreement).
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bers,151 and it is not clear whether these state legislators intended that
members be allowed to delegate actual authority to managers while
retaining apparent authority to bind the LLC, or only that members
be allowed to delegate all authority (both actual and apparent) to
managers.
Some of these states require that managers be named in the arti-
cles or the operating agreement,' 52 some require designation of man-
agers in the articles,' 5 3 and some apparently require both a
designation of managers in one or the other of such documents and an
express transfer of as much authority as is desired. 54 In such states, a
designation of managers might be sufficient to convey actual authority
to one or more managers and to divest the members of apparent au-
thority. Since the language addressing management rights and appar-
ent authority of members varies tremendously from state to state, and
is not spelled out with any degree of clarity, the courts will have to
decide under what circumstances LLC members in such jurisdictions
will have the apparent authority to bind the LLC to acts within the
ordinary business of the company. To date, no such decisions have
been rendered.
151. It is possible to read statutes that vest exclusive management authority in either
members or managers as addressing apparent authority by implication. However, this in-
terpretation raises the question of why so many state statutes include separate provisions
dealing with management rights and apparent authority to bind LLCs. ALA. CODE § 10-
12-21 (Supp. 1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-654 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-
32-904 (Michie Supp. 1993); Connecticut Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 Conn. Pub.
Acts 93-267, § 16; GA. CODE. ANN. § 14-11-301 (Harrison Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-
616 (1994); IND. CODE § 23-18-3-1 (Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1317 (West
Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CoRPs. & ASS'NS § 4A-401 (1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-
8-301 (1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304C:26 (Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 2019 (West Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-20 (1992).
152. IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.702 (West Supp. 1994) (stating that management is in
members unless articles or operating agreement provide otherwise); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 2012 (West Supp. 1994) (stating that management is in managers except as provided
in articles or operating agreement); VA. CODE. ANN. § 13.1-1022 (Michie 1993) (stating
that management is in members, except as provided in articles or operating agreement).
153. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-681.A (Supp. 1993) (stating that management is in
members unless the articles of organization provide otherwise, but this is somehow subject
to the operating agreement as well); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125 (1994) (stating that
management is in members unless in managers as designated in the articles; this provision
addresses apparent authority as well).
154. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (1993) (stating that management is in members
except as provided in agreement, and then management is in managers to the extent so
vested); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (Supp. 1993) (stating that management is in members,
except if the articles or the operating agreement so provides, management may be vested
in managers).
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In other states, the statutes purport to address the issue of au-
thority by adding a provision which specifies that in member-managed
LLCs only members can enter into binding contracts on behalf of the
LLC and in manager-managed LLCs, only managers will have that
authority.155 The statutes differ as to what is required for designation
of managers 156 and leave open the question of what happens when
managers are chosen in a different way, or when the articles or operat-
ing agreement purport to leave some power in the hands of members.
Thus, even in these statutes, where the drafters apparently wanted to
be more careful with regard to apparent authority of members, there
are a number of open questions about member authority that will
have to be resolved in the context of particular LLCs.
155. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.424 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994) (stating that except as pro-
vided in the articles, no debts or liabilities shall be incurred except by managers in the case
of manager-managed LLCs and members in the case of member-managed LLCs); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.301 (Michie 1994) (stating that no debts or liabilities shall be in-
curred except by managers in the case of manager-managed LLCs and members in the case
of member-managed LLCs where the articles so provide); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
1528n, § 2.10 (West Supp. 1994) (stating that except as provided in the articles or regula-
tions, no debts or liabilities shall be incurred except by managers in the case of manager-
managed LLCs, members in the case of member-managed LLCs, and any agent with ap-
parent authority); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-21 (Supp. 1994) (stating that no debts or liabili-
ties shall be incurred except by managers in the case of manager-managed LLCs and
members in the case of member-managed LLCs); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-117 (1989 & Supp.
1994) (no debts or liabilities shall be incurred except by one or more managers in the case
of manager-managed LLCs and one or more members in the case of member-managed
LLCs).
Colorado is different in that it is the only state which clearly provides that its LLCs
must be manager-managed. Nonetheless, Colorado complicates the issue of actual and
apparent authority by including a provision on contracting debts and liabilities that is
analogous to the statutes listed above. The Colorado statute says that, except as provided
in the articles or operating agreement, only managers will be able to bind the LLC. COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-407 (West Supp. 1993). Presumably, this means that the members
of a Colorado LLC could elect in either the articles or an operating agreement to give
members actual and/or apparent authority. The North Dakota statute can also be inter-
preted as mandating the election of a board of governors, but this is not entirely certain
since the statute says that if the members desire to act by unanimous consent or vote, they
do not need to have governors. N.D. CENT. CODE. § 10-32-69.1 (1994).
156. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.422 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994) (stating that managers must
be designated in the articles); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.291 (Michie 1994) (stating that
managers must be designated in the articles); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 2.10
(West Supp. 1994) (management is presumed to be in the hands of managers, unless the
regulations reserve such power to the members); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-18 (Supp. 1994)
(stating that the articles or operating agreement can designate managers); W-yo. STAT.
§ 17-15-117 (1989 & Supp. 1994) (stating that managers must be designated in the articles).
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Finally, some states expressly address the mutual agency of mem-
bers, but do not clarify the issue to any substantial extent. 57 The Ar-
kansas statute, which provides a good example, contains two
provisions'58 relevant to the issue of apparent authority. 159 The first
provides that, absent agreement to the contrary in the articles of or-
ganization, members in an Arkansas LLC will have mutual agency as
to each other160 and that if there is a specific delegation of authority to
managers in the articles of organization, the members will be stripped
of their ability to bind the LLC solely by reason of being a member.' 61
The second statutory provision appears to say that the members can
also delegate their management authority via terms in the operating
agreement.' 62 While a fair reading of the statutory language indicates
that the Arkansas Legislature was probably attempting to allow mem-
bers the option of designating managers without stripping themselves
of apparent authority, the language is anything but clear. The actual
provision dealing with the effect of delegating authority in an operat-
ing agreement states:
If the articles of organization indicate that management of the lim-
ited liability company is vested in a manager or managers, or unless
an operating agreement vests management of the limited liability
company in one or more managers, then the manager or managers
shall have exclusive power to manage the business and affairs of the
limited liability company except to the extent otherwise provided in
an operating agreement. 163
The real problem stems from the use of the word "power" when the
legislature refers to rights of managers. Under ordinary agency princi-
ples, "power" generally refers to both actual and apparent author-
ity. 64 If "power" is read in this way, however, there is absolutely no
157. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-32-101 to -1314 (Michie Supp. 1993); MD. CODE
ANN., CoRPs & ASS'NS § 4A-402 (1993).
158. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-32-301, 42-32-401 (Michie Supp. 1993).
159. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-32-101 to -1316 (Michie Supp. 1993).
160. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-301(a) (Michie Supp. 1993).
161. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-301(b) (Michie Supp. 1993).
162. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-401 (Michie Supp. 1993) (unless provided by either the
articles of organization or by written operating agreement, management is to be vested in
the members).
163. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-401 (Michie Supp. 1993).
164. According to the Second Restatement of Agency, "[a]uthority is the power of the
agent to affect the legal relations of the principal by acts done in accordance with the
principal's manifestations of consent to him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7
(1958). Apparent authority is also defined in terms of the agent's "power" to act. "Appar-
ent authority is the power to affect the legal relations of another person by transactions
with third persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising from and in accordance with
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need for distinguishing between the effect of including a delegation of
authority in the articles of organization and an operating agreement.
The end result of this analysis is that it is not always easy to deter-
mine whether a manager-managed LLC should be viewed in the same
way as a general partnership with managing partners (i.e., as having
hybrid-management). To the extent that LLC members do retain ap-
parent authority, there is some justification for assuming that the
members are not completely helpless, passive investors requiring the
protection of the securities laws, even if the entity is manager-
managed.
As noted, the second possibility is that the LLCs might attempt to
avoid the corporate characteristic of centralized management by seek-
ing to look like a limited partnership. Under current Treasury regula-
tions, a limited partnership will lack centralized management unless
the limited partners own substantially all of the partnership inter-
ests. 165 In other words, if the general partner in the limited partner-
ship has a substantial interest in the partnership, then the limited
partnership will lack centralized management. In a manager-managed
LLC, this would require that the managers be members with a sub-
stantial interest in the company. This would provide substantial pro-
tection to those members with management authority and might
provide protection to members with minority interests who presuma-
bly would have the right to vote on continuation of the managers.
However, the viability of this alternative under the federal income tax
code is questionable. The Internal Revenue Service has indicated that
it will not consider the percentage of membership interests actually
held by members in manager-managed LLCs, ruling in one case that a
manager-managed LLC possessed centralized management even
where all members were in fact serving as managers. 166
the other's manifestations to such third persons." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 8
(1958).
165. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(as amended in 1993).
166. The letter rulings that the IRS has released on LLCs focus on whether manage-
ment rights proceed from membership status or must be conferred independent of that
status. All eight of the rulings published as of the date of this writing that have evaluated
manager-managed LLCs have found the corporate characteristic of centralized manage-
ment to be present. See Rev. Proc. 93-53, 1993-26 I.R.B. 7; Rev. Proc. 93-50, 1993-25 I.R.B.
13; Rev. Proc. 93-49, 1993-25 I.R.B. 11; Rev. Rul. 93-38, 1993-1 C.B. 233; Rev. Rul. 93-30,
1993-1 C.B. 231; Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-1 C.B. 229; Rev. Rul. 93-5, 1993-1 C.B. 227; Rev. Rul.
88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. This was true even of an LLC in which all members were in fact
managers because their managerial status came about as a result of their having been
elected. Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-1 C.B. 229.
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Of course, it is possible that an LLC can be structured to possess
the characteristic of centralized management, so long as the LLC does
not also possess the corporate characteristic of continuity of life. The
question would then become whether the requirement that the LLC
in question must lack continuity of life would provide any meaningful
protection to investors.
Under the regulations, continuity of life is lacking if the death,
retirement, resignation, incapacity, bankruptcy, or insolvency of any
partner triggers a dissolution of the organization. 167 By unanimous
vote of the remaining partners, or even upon a majority vote in the
case of a limited partnership, the business of the partnership may be
continued without resulting in the entity possessing the characteristic
of continuity of life.168 Also, the IRS recently ruled that a limited
partnership will not possess the corporate characteristic of continuity
of life as long as it requires a unanimous vote of the general partners
or a majority vote of the limited partners to continue the business. 69
If, as this language implies, any LLC member can dissolve the
organization by resigning, and such dissolution can only be overcome
by a vote of all or at least a majority of the remaining members,' 70 this
places investors in a powerful position. Even the requirement that at
167. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1993).
168. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1993). See Glensder Textile Co. v.
Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942), acq. 1942-1 C.B. 8.
169. Rev. Proc. 92-35, 1992-1 C.B. 790. The IRS has issued private letter rulings indi-
cating that similar standards will apply to LLCs. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-21-047 (May
28, 1993).
170. Critics of this argument might suggest that this fact renders the right of dissatisfied
members to trigger dissolution insignificant. If a promoter sells an interest in an LLC to an
investor and retains at least a majority of the remaining interests, the promoter could
thwart any attempt to dissolve the LLC by casting the promoter's majority vote for
continuance.
The IRS has, however, been willing to look at whether corporate characteristics are
present in fact or merely in appearance. For example, in evaluating whether a German
unincorporated association should be classified as a corporation or partnership for tax pur-
poses, the IRS looked beyond the form of the operating documents in Rev. Rul. 93-4,
1993-1 C.B. 2255. In that case, the German business entity argued that it lacked the corpo-
rate characteristic of free transferability of interests because the operating documents re-
quired unanimous approval of other owners before any ownership interests could be
transferred. The Service found that, in reality, because all owners of the entity were wholly
owned subsidiaries of the same parent company, any time either wanted to transfer an
interest, the other would surely consent. Thus, in reality, there was no restriction on trans-
ferability of the interests in question.
Similarly, if a majority interest in an LLC is retained by a promoter, the Service might
decide that majority consent to continue the LLC in operation would be no more than a
sham, resulting in the LLC possessing the characteristic of continuity of life, possibly cost-
ing the LLC its partnership tax classification.
least a majority of members elect to continue the business of the LLC
would give members a high degree of protection. If they are cheated
or defrauded, members need not rely on state fraud laws since they
can trigger dissolution of the LLC by resigning.
The foregoing analysis is not completely settled. In fact, there is a
degree of uncertainty surrounding the tax classification of LLCs. In
April 1993, the Acting Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service
promulgated new final Treasury regulations relating to the character-
istic of continuity of life of limited partnerships. 17 1 When the amend-
ments were first proposed in July 1992, commentators suggested that
the regulations be clarified to specifically include LLCs.172 The IRS
expressly declined to adopt this suggestion on the grounds that the
notice of proposed rule making had set forth a very limited approach
that should not be abandoned to address the issue of LLCs. 73
Commentators also requested that the IRS clarify whether an en-
tity lacks the corporate characteristic of continuity of life if only one
event of withdrawal, such as bankruptcy, triggered dissolution. 74
Other commentators requested a clarification to "indicate that an or-
ganization will lack continuity of life if a dissolution occurs upon an
event of withdrawal of any member and that 'any' does not mean
'each.""175 The IRS also declined to adopt these suggestions, stating
that while the concerns had merit, they had either been addressed in
other published guidance or would be considered in future
publications. 176
In support of this contention, the IRS cited four revenue rulings,
all of which specifically relate to LLCs,177 and one revenue proce-
dure. 78 Three of the revenue rulings involved domestic LLCs seeking
a ruling on their tax classification. 179 Each of these three rulings in-
171. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended by T.D. 8475, 1993-1 C.B. 236).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-1 C.B. 229 (classifying a Colorado LLC as a partnership);
Rev. Rul. 93-5, 1993-1 C.B. 227 (classifying a Virginia LLC as a partnership); Rev. Rul. 93-
4, 1993-1 C.B. 225 (dealing with a German limited liability company); Rev. Rul. 88-76,
1988-2 C.B. 360 (classifying a Wyoming LLC as a partnership).
178. Rev. Proc. 92-35, 1992-1 C.B. 790 (dealing with limited partnerships that provide
for dissolution of the partnership upon the bankruptcy or removal of a general partner).
179. Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-1 C.B. 229 (classifying a Colorado LLC as a partnership);
Rev. Rul. 93-5, 1993-1 C.B. 227 (classifying a Virginia LLC as a partnership); Rev. Rul. 88-
76, 1988-2 C.B. 360 (classifying a Wyoming LLC as a partnership).
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volved LLCs that would dissolve upon the death, resignation, or ex-
pulsion of any member,180 and in each case the IRS concluded that the
LLC in question should be classified as a partnership. None of these
rulings provides guidance on whether an LLC will be held to possess
the characteristic of continuity of life if only one of the events of with-
drawal listed in the regulations triggers dissolution. Nor does any of
them answer the question of how to analyze an LLC that would dis-
solve upon an event of withdrawal by some but not all members (e.g.,
an LLC that would dissolve upon the resignation of the managing-
member, but not upon the resignation of any of the other members).
The cited revenue procedure does suggest a possible answer to
the former question, but only in the context of limited partnerships.' 8 '
In the revenue procedure, the IRS stated that it would not take the
position that a limited partnership lacked the characteristic of con-
tinuity of life if the bankruptcy or removal of a general partner trig-
gered dissolution of the limited partnership. 182 This leaves the
question of what would happen to an LLC that dissolves on the bank-
ruptcy of a member but not on that member's voluntary resignation.
In several jurisdictions, this question may be academic because
the authorizing legislation appears to mandate that dissolution be trig-
gered upon the happening of any event of withdrawal. 83 In many
180. In each case, this result was compelled by state statute. The Wyoming LLC stat-
ute provides that a Wyoming LLC shall be dissolved
[u]pon the death, retirement, resignation, expulsion, bankruptcy, dissolution of a
member or occurrence of any other event which terminates the continued mem-
bership of a member in the limited liability company, unless the business of the
limited liability company is continued by the consent of all the remaining mem-
bers under a right to do so stated in the articles of organization of the limited
liability company.
Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-123 (1989 & Supp. 1994). Accord COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-801
(West Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1046 (Michie 1993).
181. Rev. Proc. 92-35, 1992-1 C.B. 790 deals with limited partnerships that provide for
dissolution of the partnership upon the bankruptcy or removal of a general partner.
182. Id.
183. The following states provide for dissolution upon an event of dissociation of any
member unless the remaining members thereafter elect to continue the LLC in existence:
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-781.A.3 (Supp. 1993); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-
801(1)(c) (West Supp. 1993); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-801(4) (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 608.441(1)(c) (West 1993 & Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.1301.3 (West Supp.
1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7622(a)(3) (Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 347.137(3) (1993);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.491.1(c) (Michie 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-48 (West
Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-39.A(3) (Michie Repl. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 10-32-109.1 (1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2037.A.3 (West Supp. 1994); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAws ANN. § 47-34-29(3) (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1046(3) (Michie 1993); W.
VA. CODE § 31-1A-35(3) (Supp. 1994); and Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-123(a)(iii) (1989 & Supp.
1994).
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states, however, while this is the default rule, the members are appar-
ently free to agree to alternate arrangements. 184 It is, therefore, possi-
ble that an LLC could be formed in such a way that no member would
have the right to voluntarily dissolve it. In this case, the argument that
the Internal Revenue Code provides an alternative system of regula-
tion that acts to protect investors would be significantly weakened.
Nonetheless, the Code certainly provides a degree of regulation that is
completely missing in the case of promissory notes.
The analysis presented in this Section demonstrates how poorly
the Reves analysis applies to LLC membership interests. Reves
adopted a presumption that promissory notes are securities unless the
family resemblance test is met. It did not purport to adopt a test ap-
plicable to other types of interests. Certainly if there were no alterna-
tive approaches available, one might stretch, with some degree of
difficulty, the Reves test to apply to LLC membership interests, de-
spite the obvious complexities and problems such an approach would
entail. However, since there is an alternate approach available which
was designed to apply to interests that do not fit a well-established
pattern, it seems preferable to follow that approach when attempting
to analyze whether LLC membership interests will be securities.
184. The following state statutes also provide that, in the absence of an agreement to
the contrary, the LLC will dissolve upon the dissociation of any member. However, these
statutes apparently permit the members of an LLC to agree in advance that dissociation
will not trigger dissolution. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-901(c) (Michie Supp. 1993); GA.
CODE. ANN. § 14-11-602(4) (Harrison Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-642(3)(b) (1994);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/35-1(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-902(3) (1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.80 (West Supp. 1994);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:50(IV)(b) (Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-39(d)
(1992); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 6.01(B) (West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 48-2b-137(3) (1994).
A number of statutes contain wording that makes it difficult to tell if the members will
be able to eliminate one or more events of dissociation as a trigger for dissolution. The
most common wording in these statutes is to the effect that dissociation of any member
triggers dissolution unless the LLC is continued by unanimous agreement or as otherwise
provided in an operating agreement. This raises the question of whether the drafters in-
tend to allow the operating agreement only to provide a different procedure for exercising
continuation rights after the fact or also to allow the members to remove events of dissoci-
ation as triggers for dissolution prior to the event in question. ALA. CODE § 10-12-
37(3)(9b) (Supp. 1993); Connecticut Limited Liability Act, 1993 Conn. Pub. Acts 93-267,
§ 41; IND. CODE § 23-18-9-1(3) (Supp. 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:1334(3) (West
Supp. 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4801(d) (West Supp. 1994); MoNTr. CODE
ANN. § 35-8-901(3) (1993).
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D. LLC Membership Interests as Investment Contracts
In many respects, applying any of the previously discussed tests
would be a little like trying to force the stepsister's foot into Cinder-
ella's shoe. Each of those tests was developed in the context of a spe-
cific type of interest that, in most cases, is distinct from an LLC
membership interest. An LLC membership interest is not corporate
stock, even though LLCs share certain characteristics with corpora-
tions. Nor is an LLC membership interest exactly analogous to a part-
nership interest, although LLCs will typically have a number of
characteristics in common with partnerships-either general or lim-
ited-depending on the management structure of the particular LLC.
Finally, an LLC membership interest is not a promissory note. As
demonstrated, tests that were developed in the context of these other
types of interests are not easily applied to LLCs. However, there is
another approach that seems well suited to analyzing LLC member-
ship interests, and a number of commentators have assumed in pass-
ing that it will be applied to LLC membership interests. 85 This test is
the investment contract analysis originally adopted by the Supreme
Court in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.186
Most courts seeking to determine applicability of the federal se-
curities laws to LLC membership interests will probably attempt to
determine whether such interests fit within the definition of an invest-
ment contract. The investment contract has long been recognized as
one of the broad, catch-all terms in the laundry list of interests that
qualify as securities. 187 Examining whether a particular interest is an
investment contract is, therefore, an appropriate approach for analyz-
ing interests that do not fit well into other categories.
Neither the '33 nor '34 Act defines investment contract, although
the term appears in both statutes. The general definition of an invest-
185. E.g., Scott A. Anderson, The Illinois Limited Liability Company: A Flexible Al-
ternative for Business, 25 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 55 (1993); Geu, Understanding the LLC, Part
Two, supra note 1; Bill P. Guest, Limited Liability Company: Oklahoma's Limited Liabil-
ity Company Act Concerns, Considerations and Conclusions, 46 OKLA. L. REv. 349
(1993); Keatinge, et al. supra note 2; William K. Normal, A Practical Primer on the Busi-
ness Law and Tax Aspects of Using a Limited Liability Company, 27 Bnv. HILLS B.A. J. 82
(1993); Bradley J. Sklar & W. Todd Carlisle, The Alabama Limited Liability Company Act,
45 ALA. L. Rav. 145 (1993). Although none of these articles addresses the securities law
classification of LLC membership interests in detail, each appears to assume that the ap-
propriate analysis would be for a court to focus on whether the membership interest in
question qualifies as an investment contract.
186. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
187. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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ment contract is derived from Howeyl 8s-a case that raised at least as
many questions as it answered. In Howey, the Supreme Court stated
that investment contract "means a contact, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led
to expect profits solely from the efforts of a promoter or third
party."'189 Unfortunately, this deceptively simple statement left many
issues unanswered.
Does the Howey test really require an investment of money, or
will the commitment of property or even services suffice? What is
necessary to support a finding of a "common enterprise"? Does com-
monality require only common interests between the investor and the
promoter (vertical commonality), or must multiple investors share in
the same interests (horizontal commonality)? What is meant by the
expectation of profits? Perhaps most importantly, what does it mean
that such profits must be expected "solely" from the efforts of a third
party? Finally, if these prongs are all met, does that automatically
mean that the interest will be a security? 190
There have been attempts to answer all of these questions in one
way or another by various courts. Some of the answers are relatively
definite; other questions remain open. For example, the Supreme
Court has held that an investment need not be in cash to satisfy the
first prong of the test.' 9 ' Six circuits have addressed the commonality
issue.192 Some courts require horizontal commonality;193 others ac-
cept a showing of vertical commonality;194 and a compromise position
188. 328 U.S. 293.
189. Id. at 298-99.
190. This last question is not obvious from a reading of the Howey decision. In recent
years, however, there have been indications that the Howey four-part test may not be suffi-
cient to determine definitively whether an interest should be classified as a security. See
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559-60 (1982) (holding that because of the unique
nature of one-on-one negotiations in a slaughterhouse, investment scheme was not a
security).
191. In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979), the Supreme
Court found that this element was met if "the purchaser gave up some tangible and defina-
ble consideration in return for an interest that had substantially the characteristics of a
security." Id. at 560.
192. The Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits have all addressed the issue of commonality. See infra notes 193-196.
193. See Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, 682 F.2d 459, 460 (3d Cir. 1982); Curran v. Merrill
Lynch, 622 F.2d 216, 221-24 (6th Cir. 1980), affd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982);
Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 276-77 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
887 (1972).
194. See Villeneuve v. Advanced Business Concepts Corp., 698 F.2d 1121, 1124 (11th
Cir. 1983), affd en banc, 730 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1984); SEC v. Continental Commodities
Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 521-23 (5th Cir. 1974).
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has been employed by yet another circuit. 195 Regarding the determi-
nation of profits, some courts have adopted a liberal interpretation,
finding that even the expectation of tax benefits will satisfy this ele-
ment.196 However, the Supreme Court had apparently employed a
more restrictive approach in an earlier decision. 197
The aspect of the Supreme Court's definition of investment con-
tract that has generated the most controversy is the requirement that
investors must expect profits "solely" from the efforts of others. The
term "solely," if interpreted literally, would rob the term "investment
contract" of much of its usefulness as a general category-of interests
that are to be classified as securities. Only totally passive investors
would be protected by the securities laws under this approach. A lit-
eral interpretation would exclude interests in which the form of the
transaction offered a minute degree of theoretical involvement to in-
vestors, even if the economic and practical realities of the situation
were such that the investors had no meaningful control over their in-
vestment and were forced to rely on the expertise of others.
The likely solution to this problem was provided by the Ninth
Circuit in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.198 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the appropriate interpretation of the third element of
the Howey test was to require proof that efforts by someone other
than the investor "are the undeniably significant ones, those essential
managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enter-
prise."' 99 A majority of the other federal circuits have also adopted
this approach.2°° Moreover, the Supreme Court, in United Housing
195. The Ninth Circuit has not accepted either the horizontal commonality or the verti-
cal commonality approach. Horizontal commonality, in the sense that multiple investors
must pool their resources, is clearly not required. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit
requires more than that the promoter has a common interest with the investor by virtue of
earning commissions in exchange for advice. Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th
Cir. 1978); El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 419
U.S. 900 (1974).
196. SEC v. Goldfield Deep Mines, 758 F.2d 459,463-64 (9th Cir. 1985); SEC v. Aqua-
Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 583 (2d Cir.), cert denied sub nom. Hecht v. SEC, 459
U.S. 1086 (1982); Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 407-08 (7th Cir. 1978), cert denied,
440 U.S. 939 (1979).
197. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). Justice Powell, writing
for the majority, seemed to limit the definition of profits to capital appreciation or partici-
pation in earnings. Id. at 852.
198. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
199. Id. at 482.
200. See SEC v. Professional Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 357 (6th Cir. 1984); Goodwin v.
Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); Aqua-Sonic
Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d at 582; Kim v. Cochenour, 687 F.2d 210, 213 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982);
Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 778-79 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Aldrich v. McCul-
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Foundation v. Foreman,201 referred to a "reasonable expectation of
profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of
others," omitting the word "solely" from the rephrased Howey formu-
lation302 However, because the Court expressly declined to state
whether it was adopting the Ninth Circuit view, 20 3 there is still some
room for doubt as to the proper interpretation of this aspect of the
Howey test.
It is important to focus on this particular element in the definition
of an investment contract since proper classification of LLC member-
ship interests under this test is likely to depend on the extent to which
members in the LLC are dependent on the efforts of others for a re-
turn on their contributions. All of the other elements of the Howey
test are likely to be met in the vast majority of instances, regardless of
the language employed in the state LLC statute or any advance plan-
ning by members or their attorneys.
The first element of the Howey test, as currently interpreted, re-
quires that the purchaser give up some tangible and definable consid-
eration in return for the interest. Most LLC membership interests will
undoubtedly be acquired in a way that meets this criterion, regardless
of how the LLC is organized or operated. In fact, one commentator
has asserted that most are likely to be acquired in exchange for
money.20 4 It is unrealistic to expect that any degree of planning will
enable members to avoid this element, either upon the initial issuance
of such interests or their subsequent transfer.
The second part of the Howey test requires commonality. As
mentioned earlier, there are two competing interpretations of the re-
quirements under this element. In some jurisdictions, vertical com-
monality-common interests between the investor and manager of the
enterprise-suffices to meet this test. Very few LLCs are likely to fail
this test, although a manager-managed LLC in which the manager is
not a member and will receive compensation independent of the suc-
cess of the venture is at least conceivable. Other jurisdictions require
horizontal commonality-a pooling of interests by members. In the
majority of situations, even this more restrictive test will be satisfied
since there are likely to be more than two or three members in most
loch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1040 n.3 (10th Cir. 1980); Fargo Partners v. Dain
Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d
473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974).
201. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
202. Id. at 852.
203. Id. at 852 n.16.
204. Sargent, supra note 17, at 1096.
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LLCs whose contributions to the venture will be combined and whose
fortunes will rise or fall together.205
The requirement of expectation of profits is also likely to be satis-
fied in the majority of cases. Investors in LLCs are likely to be seek-
ing profits,20 6 although tax benefits may also play a significant role in
attracting investors. While sophisticated planning might be successful
in attracting investors via unconventional benefits rather than profits,
this is not likely to be the case. Moreover, it is possible that an expec-
tation of receiving even the more exotic benefits might satisfy this
test.207
The final requirement, that the expectation of profits be based on
the entrepreneurial efforts of others, is the one element that is likely
to be determinative in most instances when an investment contract
analysis is applied. Commentators who have focused on the issue of
the proper characterization of LLC membership interests treat this as
the critical factor,208 as do commentators who address the securities
classification of LLC membership interests more briefly.20 9
Each of the LLC management alternatives discussed previously
(member management, manager management, and hybrid manage-
ment) has different ramifications when it comes to applying this ele-
ment of the Howey investment contract analysis. In the member-
managed LLC, members would only in very unusual circumstances be
able to argue that they must rely on the entrepreneurial efforts of
others rather than on their own management skills. In this model,
members have ultimate power over the LLC. Although statutes vary
as to how the management authority will be divided among the mem-
bers, and this is subject to further agreement of the parties, the gen-
eral framework is essentially antithetical to the notion of member
passivity.
In the hybrid management situation, involving delegation of ac-
tual authority to managers but retention of apparent authority, a very
strong analogy can be drawn between the LLC and a general partner-
205. In fact, only two states would permit an LLC to be formed with fewer than two
members and even in those states, it is a relatively unlikely form of business enterprise.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-201 (Michie Supp. 1993); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
1528n, § 4.01 (West. Supp. 1994).
206. See Sargent, supra note 17, at 1096.
207. See Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388,407-08 (7th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Aqua-Sonic
Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577,583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hecht v. SEC, 459 U.S. 1086
(1982); SEC v. Goldfield Deep Mines, 758 F.2d 459, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1985).
208. Sargent, supra note 17, at 1083; Steinberg & Conway, supra note 17, at 1109-13.
209. E.g., Geu, Understanding the LLC, Part Two, supra note 1, at 510-18.
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ship with one or more managers. General partners, while free to dele-
gate actual authority to others, cannot divest themselves of apparent
authority, which they possess by statute. This apparent authority may
sufficiently show that general partners are not relying solely on the
entrepreneurial efforts of their appointed managers. Current cases
treat general partners as relying on the entrepreneurial efforts of
others only when the general partner "was so dependent on the pro-
moter or a third party that he was in fact unable to exercise meaning-
ful partnership powers.1210
Similarly, in an LLC where members retain apparent authority to
bind their company, a strong argument can be made that they retain
traditional "partnership" power. This is especially true in instances
when according to statute, articles of organization, or operating agree-
ment, the members retain a significant degree of control over the
managers.
In manager-managed LLCs in which members have divested
themselves of apparent as well as actual authority, it is likely that the
members will rely solely on the efforts of others. If a member is
elected to serve as a manager or becomes a manager of a manager-
managed LLC in some other fashion, 211 the member will probably not
210. Williamson v. fucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1981). The Fifth Circuit in Wil-
liamson offered three examples of when a general partnership interest might properly be
classified as a security:
(1) an agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the hands of the
partner or venturer that the arrangement in fact distributes power as would a
limited partnership; or (2) the partner or venturer is so inexperienced and
unknowledgeable in business affairs that he in incapable of intelligently exercising
his partnership or venture powers; or (3) the partner or venturer is so dependent
on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the promoter or man-
ager that he cannot replace the manager of the enterprise or otherwise exercise
meaningful partnership or venture powers.
Id.
211. This cumbersome structure may result because of the interaction between particu-
lar state LLC statutes and the Tax Code. The Colorado LLC legislation provides that
"management of the limited liability company's business and affairs shall be vested in a
manager or managers." COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-401 (West Supp. 1993). It is per-
missible to provide that the members shall be the managers.
The reason why LLCs are most likely to adopt such a provision is that they may be
attempting to avoid the corporate characteristic of centralized management. As discussed
earlier, LLCs are likely to attempt to avoid this in order to insure that they are classified as
partnerships for tax purposes. See discussion supra notes 36-45. The rulings that the IRS
has released on LLCs focus on whether management rights proceed from membership
status or must be conferred independent of that status. All eight of the rulings published
as of the date of this writing that have evaluated manager-managed LLCS have found the
corporate characteristic of centralized management to be present. Rev. Rul. 93-53, 1993-26
I.R.B. 7 (Fla.); Rev. Rul. 93-50, 1993-25 I.R.B. 13 (W. Va.); Rev. Rul. 93-49, 1993-25 I.R.B.
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be relying on the efforts of others. However, in most cases, members
of manager-managed LLCs, who are not also managers, completely
lack authority, either actual or apparent. Such members would ap-
pear to be relying on the efforts of others, thus satisfying the fourth
prong of the Howey test. The exceptional situation exists in which the
powers of members as set out in the operating agreement were so
extensive that it would be inaccurate to depict the non-managing
member as a passive investor.
If the discussion ended here, it would appear that some LLC
membership interests should be classified as securities under the
Howey investment contract analysis. It would also appear that one
could draw a general demarcation line between manager-managed
LLCs (which typically should be securities) and member-managed
LLCs (which should not be). In addition, it would be unlikely that
membership interests in LLCs with a hybrid management model
would be classified as securities.
There is, however, an additional complication that needs to be
addressed. There have been some recent indications that the Howey
test should include a consideration of whether the interest at issue
involves a privately negotiated transaction or a sale to the public. 212
This factor suggests that not all membership interests in manager-
managed LLCs should be classified as securities.
In Marine Bank v. Weaver,213 the Supreme Court was asked to
determine whether a certificate of deposit and a profit-sharing agree-
ment were securities. Both the certificate of deposit and the profit
sharing arrangement were entered into after substantial, one-on-one
negotiations between the interested parties.214 In its brief discussion
of the certificate of deposit, the Court ignored Howey and found that
the instruments were amply protected by the existence of comprehen-
11 (IL1.); Rev. Rul. 93-38, 1993-1 C.B. 223 (Del.); Rev. Rul. 93-30, 1993-1 C.B. 231 (Nev.);
Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-1 C.B. 227 (Colo.); Rev. Rul. 93-5, 1993-3 I.R.B. 6 (Va.); Rev. Rul. 88-
76, 1988-2 C.B. 360 (Wyo.). This was true even of the LLC in which all members were in
fact managers because their managerial status came about as a result of their having been
elected. Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-1 C.B. 227. It might be possible to avoid this result even in a
manager-managed LLC if the articles of organization or operating agreement provides that
all members will automatically become members by virtue of their status as members,
without any additional act by any party. This is by no means certain, however.
212. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559-60 (1982).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 553, 560.
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sive federal banking regulations, and thus did not need the protection
of the federal securities laws.215
With regard to the profit-sharing agreement, the Court was also
reluctant to employ the Howey test. Instead, the Court focused on the
nature of the transaction and the bargaining between the parties.
Although the profit sharing arrangement would presumably have sat-
isfied the Howey test, the Court concluded that this was "not sufficient
to make that agreement a security. '2 16 Because the agreement had
been privately negotiated and was essentially unique, the Court de-
clined to treat it as a security.217
At least one commentator has concluded that Weaver is a clear
indication that the Supreme Court now views Howey as a necessary
but not sufficient condition for finding an investment contract.218
Under this approach, even if LLC membership interests satisfied the
Howey test, they would only be considered to be securities if sufficient
other factors were also present.
The other factor that was clearly missing in Weaver was the ab-
sence of any impersonal market.219 The profit-sharing agreement in
Weaver was negotiated one-on-one and did not implicate any estab-
lished market. While LLC membership interests will not always be
negotiated on a one-on-one basis, they will certainly not implicate any
established securities markets. Thus, the almost certain absence of
any wide trading in such interests provides yet another reason for sus-
pecting that, under the investment contract analysis, LLC membership
interests will generally not qualify as securities.220
III. Should the Federal Securities Law Apply to LLC
Membership Interests?
As discussed, under current rules governing the characterization
of interests as securities, there is a good chance that LLC membership
interests will generally not be classified as securities. This conclusion
215. Id. at 558-59. The Court found that the federal banking regulations offered suffi-
cient protection even though the certificate of deposit in question was in excess of the
insurance provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Id. at 553 n.1.
216. Id. at 560.
217. Id.
218. William J. Carney, Defining a Security: The Addition of a Market-Oriented Con-
textual Approach to Investment Contract Analysis, 33 EMORY L.J. 311 (1984).
219. 455 U.S. at 560.
220. For a detailed discussion of why LLCs are not likely to be traded on any estab-
lished markets and the significance of this fact, see infra notes 237-238 and accompanying
text.
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raises the question of whether that result is desirable. If the securities
laws ought to be applied to LLC membership interests, either a new
legislative formulation should be developed, or the courts should con-
sider applying a different test in order to evaluate LLC membership
interests.221 To determine whether securities laws ought to apply to
LLC membership interests, the logical starting point is to assess the
consequences of applying the federal securities laws.
The most prominent feature of both the '33 Act 222 and the '34
Act223 is the extent to which they require disclosure of information.
The statutes and the regulations promulgated thereunder by the SEC
contain detailed disclosure requirements and anti-fraud provisions to
ensure that the disclosures are both complete and accurate.2 24 In very
general terms, the '33 Act protects potential investors225 in newly is-
sued securities by ensuring that they are provided with enough infor-
221. Of course, even if they do apply a different test, there is no guarantee that a
different result will be obtained. For a discussion of how other tests might be applied to
LLC membership interests, see supra Section II.A-C.
222. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77bbbb (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
223. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
224. The informational requirements of the '33 Act require the issuer of a security to
file a registration statement and to deliver prospectuses in connection with any distribu-
tion, unless an exemption can be found. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 1-26, scheds. A-B, 15
U.S.C. 99 77a-77bbbb (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The anti-fraud provisions of the '33 Act
include section 17(a). 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1988 & Supp. III 1991)
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains ongoing reporting requirements, such as
those contained in § 17. 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The most influential
anti-fraud provision of the '34 Act is undoubtedly § 10(b). 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988 &
Supp. III 1991).
However, disclosure and anti-fraud requirements are not the sole focus of the Securi-
ties Acts. For example, another potential consequence of treating LLC membership inter-
ests as securities is that they must be sold only through the efforts of licensed broker-
dealers. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
225. This straight-forward phrase assumes a degree of complexity when the literature
debating the purpose of the federal securities acts is examined. One school of thought
views legislation as the product of competing interest groups seeking essentially to protect
or create monopoly power. E.g., ROBERT CHATOV, CORPORATE FINANCIAL REPORTING:
PUBLIC OR PRIVATE CONTROL? 186-89 (1975); JAMES S. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRIC-
TIONS ON NEW BUSINESS PROMOTIONS 12 (1971); SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD
ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC IN'rERESr (1981); George J. Benston, The Effective-
ness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, in ECONOMIC POLICY
AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 23 (Henry G. Manne ed., 1969); Henry
G. Manne, Economic Aspects of Required Disclosure Under the Federal Securities Laws, in
WALL STREET IN TRANSITION 23, 25 (Henry G. Manne & Ezra Solomon eds., 1974). The
other, and apparently prevailing view, assumes or concludes that the securities laws were
enacted in a good faith attempt to protect the public. See, e.g., HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC
AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 32-37 (1979);
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669, 680-87 (1984); Larry E. Ribstein, Private Ordering and the
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mation from the issuer to make a rational investment decision,22 6
while the '34 Act focuses on the ongoing disclosure obligations of pub-
licly held companies.227 Both Acts also incorporate specific anti-fraud
provisions designed to ensure that all disclosures are accurate and free
of fraud.228
The potential benefits from application of the mandatory disclo-
sure rules to LLC membership interests include: (1) guaranteeing that
minimally adequate information is available to investors, offering a
standardized format for information thereby facilitating comparisons
between potential investments; (2) reducing the incentive for "over
investment" in securities research by investors; and (3) providing a
basis for national litigation to resolve common factual and legal issues
in the event of a dispute.229
Securities Laws: The Case of General Partnerships, 42 CASE WES. REs. L. REV. 1, 7-18
(1992).
The Supreme Court has never expressly acknowledged this debate and appears to
have accepted the good faith of Congress in this regard without question. This Article also
assumes that the purpose of the securities laws was and is to protect the public, principally
by requiring full and accurate disclosure of material information.
226. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1988 & Supp. III 1991). "Detailed rules setting forth what
affirmative disclosures certain parties must make, and how and when they must make
them, are the focus of the ['33 Act], especially of its registration and prospectus provi-
sions." Scott FitzGibbon, What Is a Security?-A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Par-
ticipate in the Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REv. 893, 894 n.8 (1980).
227. For instance, § 13 and the regulations promulgated thereunder relate to continu-
ous disclosure obligations of publicly held companies. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1988 & Supp. III
1991). Section 14(a) authorizes the SEC to regulate disclosures to shareholders in public
companies, while § 14(d) and attendant regulations establish disclosure obligations in the
context of tender offers. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a), (d) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Section 15 and
its regulations cover, among other things, disclosures by brokers and dealers. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
228. By way of example, the language of § 10(b) of the '34 Act makes it unlawful for
any person to "use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security...
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
229. This listing of potential benefits from the current scheme of federal securities reg-
ulation is neither original nor comprehensive. Numerous other commentators have dis-
cussed the potential benefits of securities regulations and have commented on these as
justification for mandatory disclosure and/or federal anti-fraud provisions. See, e.g., John
C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System,
70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 225; Ribstein, supra note
225; David J. Schulte, The Debatable Case for Securities Disclosure Regulation, 13 J. CORP.
L. 535 (1988).
As to potential benefits that have been left off of this list, the one that has been men-
tioned most frequently is the promotion of public confidence in the securities markets.
"The justification most commonly offered for mandatory disclosure regulation is that it is
necessary to preserve public confidence in the capital markets." Schulte, supra at 539.
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In the case of LLC membership interests, the first purpose is not
likely to be particularly important. The need for an independent re-
quirement that minimal information be provided is most important in
the case of investment securities marketed nationally to a large pool
of small, passive investors.Z30 When the interest in question involves a
limited number of investors or targets participants who are likely to
have an active role in management responsibilities, the risk of inade-
quate information is minimized. When the transaction is negotiated
privately, the potential participant will normally have sufficient bar-
gaining power to insist on being provided with sufficient informa-
tion.231 Similarly, participants who will have management rights are
less likely to need the protection of mandatory disclosure since they
are likely to be sophisticated enough to ask the right questions, and
are in a position to acquire sufficient information independent of fed-
erally mandated disclosures.23 2 Moreover, if investors have manage-
ment authority, including the power to bind the entity to acts
apparently carried on in the usual course of business of that entity,233
it will clearly not be in the best interests of other participants to with-
hold any material information from such investors.
There are good reasons for believing that LLCs will involve
either privately negotiated transactions involving management re-
sponsibilities or marketing to a relatively small number of investors.23 4
However, this justification is utterly and obviously inapplicable to interests that will not be
traded on an established market.
The benefits listed in this Article include the justifications that have been most fre-
quently discussed and have at least some possibility of applying to mandatory disclosures
for LLCs.
230. See Ribstein, supra note 225, at 17-18, 22-24.
231. Where the transaction is unique, "central disclosure by the firm is rarely necessary
to overcome problems of under- and over-production of securities research." Ribstein,
supra note 225, at 23. Not only have commentators reached this conclusion, but there is
some indication that the courts agree. For example, in Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S.
551 (1982), the Court concluded that the securities laws did not apply to a one-on-one
arrangement even though it would have qualified as an investment contract under the
Howey four-part analysis. See infra notes 259-276 and accompanying text.
232. "Investors in closely held firms usually depend on their own managerial and moni-
toring skills, and therefore have relatively little need for information bearing on returns
that may be expected from the 'efforts of others."' Ribstein, supra note 225, at 22-23.
233. This is, of course, the classic scope of apparent authority of partners in a partner-
ship. A number of LLC statutes also adopt this as the agency power of members in mem-
ber-managed LLCs. See supra notes 149-166 and accompanying text.
234. There may be a number of situations in which transactions involving LLC mem-
bership interests are both negotiated privately, so that they can be structured according to
the interests of the particular participants, and are marketed only to those who will partici-
pate in management. However, it is also possible to conceive of transactions involving only
one of these two characteristics.
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In situations involving potential investment in member-managed
LLCs, any new members by definition will participate in manage-
ment.235 It is unlikely that such interests will be marketed broadly.
Even if they are, the very fact that investors will be asked to partici-
pate in management reduces the need for mandatory disclosures. Ex-
isting participants will probably not seek an unsophisticated,
uninformed member who will be given the power to bind the enter-
prise. Furthermore, an investor sufficiently sophisticated to be attrac-
tive as a potential member with management authority is not likely to
invest without adequate information, regardless of whether the fed-
eral securities laws apply to the transaction.
In situations involving manager-managed LLCs, potential inves-
tors will probably be much more passive, but it is still unlikely that a
broad, national marketing of interests will occur. For one thing, most
commentators agree that the restrictions on transfer and/or manage-
ment responsibilities236 that are inherent in LLCs make it unlikely
that LLC membership interests will be marketed to broad segments of
the public. 237 Aside from such considerations, however, if the LLC
membership interests become publicly traded, the tax advantages of-
fered by this choice of business entity are likely to disappear 238 since
under the existing tax code, a publicly traded partnership is taxed as a
corporation.239 Similar to partnerships, an LLC would be considered
to be publicly traded if its membership interests were either traded on
an established securities exchange or were readily tradeable on a sec-
ondary market or its equivalent. 240 The House Conference report on
the bill that adopted the rules on publicly traded partnerships indi-
cated that a secondary market would exist if investors are readily able
to buy, sell, or exchange their interests in a matter economically com-
235. Member-management, by definition, means that all members will have some say
in management. Under the default rules in states that permit member-management, this
would mean either that all members would have an equal say in the management of the
LLC or that each would have a proportionate say based on the value of each member's
contribution. See statutes cited supra note 27.
236. Recall that in order to preserve the benefits of classification as a partnership for
tax purposes, no LLC may possess both free transferability and centralized management.
See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
237. See Kalinka, supra note 1, at 1093; S. Brian Farmer & Louis A. Mezzullo, The
Virginia Limited Liability Company Act, 25 U. RIcH. L. REV. 789, 836 (1991); Susan Pace
Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Possible Choice for Doing Business?, 41 FLA.
L. REV. 721, 746-48 (1989).
238. I.R.C. § 7704(a) (1989) (publicly traded partnership will be taxed as a corporation
unless 90% or more of its income is passive).
239. I.R.S. Notice 88-75, 1988-2 C.B. 386-87.
240. Id.
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parable to trading on an established market.241 The restrictions on
transferability of LLC membership interests included in the LLC stat-
utes would not prevent this situation from developing as long as the
economic interest (the right to receive income) could be freely trans-
ferred.242 These restrictions, therefore, provide a second reason why
LLC membership interests are unlikely to be widely marketed and are
also unlikely to require federally mandated disclosures to ensure that
investors have access to minimum information.2 43
As to the second potential benefit-offering a standardized for-
mat for information and thereby facilitating comparisons between po-
tential investments-this need is obviated since most deals will likely
involve private negotiations between the company and a limited
number of potential participants or will involve participants who will
assume management rights and responsibilities. Even if basic infor-
mation is provided in the same format, the unique ordering of each
transaction necessitated by individual negotiation and unique manage-
ment abilities and responsibilities is likely to prevent easy compari-
sons between LLCs. It is only where units are mass-marketed, and
there are equivalent competing investments available, that the need
for a standardized format in order to facilitate comparisons is
essential.244
The third potential benefit-reducing the incentive for over-in-
vestment in securities research by investors-only applies to the ex-
tent that the research by investors is excessive. It is economically
undesirable for investors to engage in securities research if multiple
investors would be engaging in essentially duplicative research, or if
the cost of amassing the required data would be reduced by having the
issuer of the securities conduct the research. To the extent that LLC
membership interests are offered only to a small number of investors,
the risk of duplicative research is reduced. Moreover, if each inves-
tor's interest would be unique, because of differing management roles
or the likelihood of individual negotiation, the research would pre-
sumably not duplicate that undertaken by others. In addition, most
material information of a general nature will be readily available from
241. H.R. CoNF. ReP. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 947-50 (1987).
242. Id.
243. There is, of course, the argument that it is still easy to conceive of a marketing
scheme directed toward a few, unsophisticated investors who do not know enough to ask
for the information that would, in fact, be readily available to them. In reality, the likeli-
hood that any such investor would actually read and/or comprehend the disclosures in the
form required by the federal securities laws is diminishingly small.
244. See Ribstein, supra note 225, at 17-18, 22-24.
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the LLC without the need for additional federal regulation because
the LLC must maintain detailed financial records under the federal
tax rules, and because most state LLC statutes require that members
be provided with access to substantial data.245
The final distinct benefit-providing a basis for national litigation
to resolve common factual and legal issues-is also minimized where a
small number of investors are involved or where the investors have
different roles. If each LLC involves a limited number of investors, or
if each investment is unique, the necessity for a single forum to resolve
common factual or legal issues is substantially reduced.
With regard to the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities
laws, the only real potential benefit is that these rules provide a basis
for national litigation.246 In the case of securities that are mass-mar-
keted, traded widely, and held by a widely dispersed group of inves-
tors, and where investors are likely to have similar interests in the
event of any dispute about the accuracy of disclosures, the need for a
mechanism to resolve claims expeditiously is obvious. Since LLC
membership interests are likely to be sold on a much more limited
basis and there is virtually no possibility that the interests will be mar-
keted widely enough for even a strong secondary market to develop,
the need for a federal forum in which to resolve claims is less impor-
tant. In addition, many LLC investors are likely to have unique
245. ALA. CODE § 10-12-16 (Supp. 1993); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-607 (Supp.
1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-411 (West Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 53-625
(1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/1-40 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IND. CODE § 23-
18-4-8 (Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.709 (West Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12:1319 (West Supp. 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4213 (West Supp.
1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.373 (West Supp. 1994); Mo. REV. STAT. § 347.091 (1993);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.241 (Michie 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-19 (Michie Repl.
1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-04 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-51 (1994); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2021 (West Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.771 (Supp. 1994); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 7-16-22 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-34-11 (1994); TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 2.22 (West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-119 (Supp.
1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1028 (Michie 1993).
Kansas imposes a requirement that every LLC file an annual report containing de-
tailed information. This report, while it does not have to be kept by the LLC, would pre-
sumably be available to interested persons as a matter of public record. KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-7647 (Supp. 1993). A few of the LLC statutes permit reasonable limitations on the
statutory record-keeping requirements. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-305 (1993); MD.
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-406 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:28 (Supp.
1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-25 (West Supp. 1994).
246. None of the other potential benefits discussed in this Article would have any ap-
plication to anti-fraud provisions since they all relate to the benefits of providing optimal
levels of information and since every state has anti-fraud laws which should be sufficient to
insure that any disclosures made are accurate.
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claims, predicated on specific information provided to them in the
course of negotiations about management rights and responsibilities.
This factor also reduces the potential benefits of a national forum for
litigation, since different investors would need to present different fac-
tual and legal claims, preventing federal litigation from being any
more efficient.
Nothing in the foregoing discussion completely eliminates the po-
tential benefits of applying federal securities laws to LLC membership
interests, and some investors would undoubtedly benefit from man-
dated disclosure and the anti-fraud rules. The real problem is that the
cost of federal regulation can be tremendous. Thus, the question be-
comes whether these potential benefits outweigh the likely cost of
regulation.
In fact, a number of commentators have argued that such cost
exceeds any benefits of mandatory disclosure, even for interests that
are widely traded on public markets to large numbers of essentially
passive investors.247 Mandatory disclosure includes direct costs such
as the expense of compiling and disseminating the required informa-
tion together with the indirect costs of all those associated with the
disclosure process and the opportunity costs that would occur when
the formidable obstacle of mandatory disclosure leads to the abandon-
ment of potentially profitable ventures. All of these costs would apply
to LLCs, despite the fact that the range of potential benefits is se-
verely restricted, given the nature of most LLC membership interests.
Moreover, the limited nature of LLC membership interests does not
mean that the cost of compliance will be similarly reduced. It has
been noted that "many of the costs of disclosure are the same, regard-
less of the size of the firm or the offering. ''248
In addition to the cost of complying with the disclosure require-
ments of the securities laws themselves, there are other potential con-
247. See ROBERTA G. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA (1982); HOMER KRIPKE, THE
SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE (1979); H.
MANNE & E. SOLOMON, WALL STREET IN TRANSITION: THE EMERGING SYSTEM AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY (1974); SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC
AND TE PUBLIC INTEREST (1981); George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock
Market. An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 132
(1973); George J. Benston, The Value of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, 44
AcCT. REv. 515 (1969); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 225; Gregg A. Jarelle, The Eco-
nomic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security Issues, 24 J. L. & ECON.
613 (1981); George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. L. 117
(1964).
248. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 225, at 671.
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sequences associated with the treatment of LLC interests as securities.
One particularly negative consequence, especially for professional ser-
vice enterprises that elect the LLC form, is the risk of being prohib-
ited from electing the cash method of accounting.249 Virtually all
professional service enterprises use the cash method of accounting in
order to take into consideration the fact that services are often per-
formed long before fees are received.250 Congress, recognizing both
the legitimate tax advantages gained by permitting taxable income to
be reported on the cash method and the potential for abuse, has im-
posed a general requirement that certain enterprises be precluded
from using the cash method of accounting.251 Among the kinds of
enterprises prohibited from relying on the cash method of accounting
are those that qualify as a "tax shelter."252
For purposes of this rule, "tax shelter" is defined to include "any
enterprise (other than a C corporation) if at any time interests in such
enterprise have been offered for sale in any offering required to be
registered with any Federal or State agency having the authority to
regulate the offering of securities .... -253 With nothing more, this
section would mean that if an offering of LLC membership interests is
made in a manner that requires registration, 254 regardless of whether
the securities laws are actually complied with, that LLC would lose
any ability to rely on the cash method of accounting-a result that is
potentially disastrous for professional service LLCs. In reality, how-
ever, the definition of "tax shelter" has been expanded far beyond
this.
In addition to defining tax shelters in the terms discussed above,
the current temporary regulations define the requirement of registra-
tion to include situations in which "under the applicable federal or
state law, failure to file a notice of exemption from registration would
result in a violation of the applicable federal or state law (regardless
249. The cash method of accounting generally permits taxable income to be reported
on the basis of cash receipts and disbursements rather than when claims accrue. See I.R.C.
§ 446 (1989).
250. See Shop Talk, 79 J. TAX'N 63 (Sheldon I. Bannoff et al. eds., 1993) (explaining
that professionals report on the cash method because of lagging collectibles and the tradi-
tional nature of professional service organizations in which charging interest on late pay-
ments is viewed as uncomfortable for both the firm and its clients).
251. I.R.C. § 448 (1989).
252. I.R.C. § 448(a)(3) (1989).
253. I.R.C. § 461(i)(3) (1989). This definition is cross-referenced in I.R.C. § 448(d)(3)
(1989).
254. Recall that the securities laws generally require any sale of a security to be regis-
tered unless an exemption is available. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988).
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of whether the notice is in fact filed). ' '255 This is critical to LLCs wish-
ing to use the cash method of accounting because most exemptions
from the federal registration requirement, and/or the regulations that
have been adopted to clarify such exemptions, require the filing of a
notice.2 6
In essence, this means that if an LLC has membership interests
that are classified as securities, the cash method of accounting may be
unavailable.257 In turn, this may mean that the LLC may be unavaila-
ble as a practical matter to a number of enterprises, or at least not
available to the extent intended by state legislatures.
The foregoing discussion clearly points toward the conclusion
that the federal securities laws should generally not be applied to LLC
membership interests because the potential benefits are so restricted
255. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.448-1T(b)(2) (as amended in 1991).
256. For example, Regulation A (Rules 251-263) requires the filing of an offering state-
ment. Regulation D (Rules 501-508) requires filing of Form D as to sales solely to accred-
ited investors under § 4(6).
The interstate offering exemption does not require the filing of any notice with the
SEC, but state Blue Sky laws may well require a notice of exemption even for small offer-
ings. Even the Internal Revenue Code recognizes that state laws may often require the
filing of a notice in order to preserve an exemption. In fact, in the provision restricting
availability of the cash method of accounting, the definition of "tax shelter" is modified to
exclude S corporations "required to file a notice of exemption from registration with a
State agency... if there is a requirement applicable to all corporations offering securities
for sale in the State that to be exempt from such registration the corporation must file such
a notice." I.R.C. § 448(d)(3) (1989). However, this exclusion does not apply to LLCs.
Note that there are similar problems with regard to state registration requirements;
however, this topic is beyond the scope of this Article.
257. As of the end of June 1994, there were a total of eight private letter rulings from
the IRS dealing with the issue of whether an LLC would be legally entitled to use the cash
method of accounting. In most of these rulings, the Service relied on a representation from
the party requesting the ruling that it would never be required to register interests in itself
(as that term is defined in the regulations) in determining that the cash method of account-
ing would not be unavailable. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-22-034 (Mar. 3, 1994), Priv. Ltr. Rul.
94-21-025 (Feb. 24, 1994), Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-15-005 (Jan. 1, 1994), Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-12-030
(Dec. 22, 1993), Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-50-013 (Sept. 15, 1993) and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-28-005
(Dec. 21, 1992). One Private Letter Ruling did not address the issue of whether the LLC
in question would be precluded from utilizing the cash method of accounting because it
might be required to "register" interests in itself prior to sale. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-07-030
(Nov. 24, 1993). In another, the Service found that the LLC could rely on the cash method
of accounting based in part upon a representation that it will not offer any interests in itself
for sale (and thus would not have to worry about either registering or finding an exemp-
tion). See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-28-005 (Dec. 21, 1992).
In none of these letter rulings did the Service discuss whether the membership inter-
ests were, in fact, to be classified as securities. However, the recited facts in most of these
letter rulings indicate that the LLCs in question would offer substantial management rights
to all owners. There is a strong possibility, therefore, that the interests would not have
been classified by the courts as securities in the first place.
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and the costs are likely to be high. This conclusion is actually quite
consistent with the views of a number of other commentators who,
while not addressing the proper classification of LLC membership in-
terests, have considered the proper scope of the securities laws. 258
For example, in 1967, Professor Ronald Coffey advanced the idea
that the securities laws ought to apply to transactions in which there is
"a need for the special fraud procedures, protection, and remedies
provided by the securities laws."259 This has probably been the most
influential article on the issue.260 In Professor Coffey's view, the fed-
eral securities laws should apply when a buyer invests funds that are
"subject to the perils of enterprise failure" if the buyer is not familiar
with the enterprise or not exercising management control.261 If the
buyer is familiar with the business and in a position to participate in its
control, he "is hardly in a position to claim that he was induced to
furnish value by means of misstatement or half-truths about the char-
acter of the venture. '262 If this approach is applied to LLCs, typical
LLC membership interests should not be covered. Many buyers will
be in a position to participate in control,263 and even when the buyer is
not expected to exercise management power, there is a good chance
that any investor will be relatively familiar with the business prior to
making an investment decision.264
258. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 218 (also arguing in favor of a market-oriented ap-
proach); Eric Chiappinelli, Reinventing a Security: Arguments for a Public Interest Defini-
tion, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 957 (1992) (suggesting that the securities laws should only
apply where public regulatory benefits would be clear); Ronald Coffey, The Economic
Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 CASE W. REs. L. REV.
367 (1967) (suggesting that the securities laws should only apply where they are specifically
needed); FitzGibbon, supra note 226 (suggesting that securities laws should only apply to
interests eligible to participate in public markets); Ribstein, supra note 225 (suggesting that
parties wishing federal securities law protection should have to "opt in" by structuring
their transaction in specific, enumerated ways).
259. Coffey, supra note 258, at 373.
260. Professor Coffey's article has been cited by the Supreme Court and many lower
federal courts. See, e.g., United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 857 n.24
(1975): Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320,321 n.2 (3d Cir. 1984); United Cal. Bank v.
Financial Corp., 557 F.2d 1351, 1358 n.9 (9th Cir. 1977); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, 497
F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974). In addition, according to Shepard's Citator, more than fifty
law review articles have made reference to this particular article.
261. Coffey, supra note 258, at 396.
262. Id.
263. This will be required in member-managed LLCs.
264. Unless the LLC is manager-managed, a potential investor will probably have ap-
parent authority to bind the LLC, making it unlikely that other owners will accept an
investor who is completely ignorant of the entity's business and affairs. Alternatively, if
the LLC is manager-managed, in order to be classified as a partnership for federal tax
purposes, the member's interests cannot be freely transferable. Few investors, even those
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Other commentators have suggested that the scope of the federal
securities laws should be determined with reference to the financial
markets.265 Under this approach, the term "security" would be lim-
ited to "financial instrument[s] eligible to participate in a public mar-
ket. '266 The justification offered for this approach is that it would pay
proper "respect [to] the intention of the framers to focus the securities
law on the financial markets, '267 while avoiding the uncertainty inher-
ent in the various approaches currently employed by the courts. 268
Application of this approach to LLC membership interests is even
easier. Since LLC membership interests would not be traded on es-
tablished financial markets,269 there would be no reason for any LLC
membership interest to be covered by the securities laws under this
approach.
Another approach that has been recommended is to ask directly
whether the particular instrument involves a transaction that needs
who are relatively unsophisticated, are likely to accept an investment in an entity with
which they have no familiarity when they will be unable to sell their interests without the
consent of other members.
Moreover, as a practical matter, the very nature of the LLC lends itself particularly
well to smaller businesses. Accord James W. Lovely, Agency Costs, Liquidity, and the Lim-
ited Liability Company as an Alterative to the Close Corporation, 21 STETSON L. REv. 377
(1992); Sylvester J. Orsi, Comment, The Limited Liability Company: An Organizational
Alternative for Small Business, 70 NEB. L. Rnv. 150 (1991); Diane Solov, Ohio Law Allows
New Business Structure, THE PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 9, 1994, at 1C (reporting that "[ljawyers
and accountants say businesses most likely to find limited liability companies appealing are
closely held firms, family-owned companies and joint ventures."). Investors in small busi-
nesses generally know enough to be cautious about the investment, and often the deals
which induce such investments are carefully negotiated.
All of this supports the conclusion that odds favor an investor in an LLC being reason-
ably well informed.
265. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 218; Chiappinelli, supra note 258; FitzGibbon, supra
note 226.
266. FitzGibbon, supra note 226, at 919 (emphasis in original). Accord Chiappinelli,
supra note 258, at 974 ("A new instrument should be subject to the securities laws when
doing so would achieve such regulatory benefits as uniformity or market consolidation,
market integrity, or market participant oversight." (footnotes omitted)).
267. FitzGibbon, supra note 226, at 918.
268. Professor Carney makes the argument that, in actuality, several courts have recog-
nized a market-oriented approach, at least implicitly. Among the examples cited by Pro-
fessor Carney are SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), in which the
Supreme Court placed significant emphasis on the market context of the offering, and
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982), in which the Court excluded a unique ar-
rangement from the scope of the securities laws because the transaction was negotiated
one-on-one, rather than in an impersonal market. Carney, supra note 218, at 334.
269. The reason for this statement is that the LLC would likely lose its tax classification
as a partnership if this happened. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
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the protection of the securities laws.270 To reconcile this approach
with existing securities jurisprudence, Professor Chang advocates the
creation of a two-tiered approach to the definition of a security.271
First, one would have to determine whether a particular device was an
instrument, such as a stock certificate, a bond, or even an investment
contract, which by reference to existing expectations could reasonably
be considered a security. The second step would be to determine if
the transaction is one that justifies application of the securities laws.27 2
LLC membership interests might easily be excluded under either tier
of this approach. LLC membership interests are not necessarily rep-
resented by any instrument since there is generally no requirement in
the LLC statutes that any "certificate" of membership be issued.2 73
Even if an LLC membership interest is found to be an instrument, all
of the reasons presented earlier as to why the potential benefits of
securities regulation are unlikely to apply to LLC membership inter-
ests apply to this analysis.
Yet another approach to the proper definition of "security" is to
adopt a private-ordering paradigm. 274 Professor Ribstein has sug-
gested that the federal courts explicitly allow parties to opt out of the
disclosure and anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws by
structuring their transaction to fit a particular form.275 The particular
form of transaction that Professor Ribstein suggested for the opt-out
270. Williamson B.C. Chang, Meaning, Reference, and Reification in the Definition of a
Security, 19 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 403 (1986).
271. Id. at 405-406.
272. "If the transaction involving an instrument does not justify the application of the
acts, then, as to this particular class of transactions, the instrument is excluded from regula-
tion." Id. at 459.
273. Lest the reader be concerned that my interpretation of the word "instrument" is
too narrow, a review of the statutory language defining a "security" might provide the best
response. For example, the term "security" is defined in the '33 Act to include "evidence of
indebtedness," a "certificate of interest of participation in any profit sharing agreement," or
"voting trust certificate." 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1988)(emphasis added). The indebtedness
or interest in the profit sharing agreement or voting trust by itself is not the security; the
certificate is.
274. Ribstein, supra note 225, at 26-36.
275. The lack of predictability offered by the current approaches seems to be one of
the most prominent justifications for allowing parties to opt out. In fact, Professor Rib-
stein quoted the following Supreme Court decisions to emphasize the fact that others have
also condemned the lack of predictability: "[W]e find more daunting.., the prospect that
parties to a transaction may never know whether they are covered by the Acts until they
engage in extended discovery and litigation .... [T]he parties' inability to determine at the
time of the transaction whether the Acts apply neither serves the Acts' protective purpose
nor permits the purchaser to compensate for the added risk of no protection when negoti-
ating the transaction." Id. at 58 (quoting Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681,
696-97 (1985) (referring to the "sale of business" doctrine that would have excluded stock
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option was the general partnership, but an equally compelling argu-
ment can be made for the LLC or at least the member-managed LLC.
As with general partnerships, most potential investors in LLCs will
not benefit tremendously from application of the securities laws.2 76
The specific attributes of the general partnership to which Professor
Ribstein pointed-the management and informational rights and the
ability to trigger dissolution-also apply to LLCs, particularly those
that are member-managed. Adopting a rule that LLC membership
interests in member-managed LLCs are per se not securities would
permit recognition of all the benefits of private ordering and predict-
ability discussed by Professor Ribstein.
Even if these alternative approaches to the definition of a secur-
ity remain no more than interesting speculation and commentary,
none of these suggestions would cut against determining that LLC
membership interests are generally not securities. With this in mind,
two questions remain. First, for state legislators wishing to make the
LLC as attractive as possible for new business ventures in their juris-
diction, what statutory provisions are most likely to lead courts to the
conclusion that LLC membership interests are not securities? Second,
regardless of the provisions of the state statute, what provisions can be
included in an LLC's articles of organization or operating agreement
as a matter of individual planning to make it more likely that the
courts will decline to apply the securities laws to membership interests
in a given LLC?
IV. Influencing Judicial Decisions
Although this Article concludes that, under existing legal guide-
lines, courts ought to decide that LLC membership interests are not
securities in most instances, there are certainly a number of choices
that can be made to make this result more likely. Some choices would
have to be made by legislators responsible for adopting and amending
the legislation that authorizes the creation of LLCs. Other choices
can be made by practitioners or others who are forming an LLC and
do not wish the membership interests therein to be subject to the fed-
eral securities laws. The first half of this Section addresses the legisla-
tive options that might make it more likely for the courts to decline to
treat LLC membership interests as securities. The latter half of this
from the definition of a security whenever the transaction at issue involved a sale of con-
trol); Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 706 (1985)).
276. See supra notes 229-246 and accompanying text.
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Section examines options available to those planning for a particular
LLC under any of the various legislative schemes.
A. Legislative Choices
Before actually addressing the statutory provisions that might
make it easier for courts to decide that LLC membership interests are
not securities, it is worth considering whether there is any meaningful
possibility of influencing state legislation. Prior to 1990, only two
states had statutes authorizing the formation of LLCs.277 In slightly
more than two and one-half years, more than thirty additional states
have adopted similar legislation, with more states likely to follow in
the future.278 Because LLC statutes are so new, no model legislation
has yet been promulgated in this regard, although there are two ver-
sions of model legislation in the drafting stage.279
Because of the lack of model legislation, the speed with which
these statutes have been passed, and differing philosophies concerning
the appropriate goals of LLC legislation,280 LLC statutes vary tremen-
dously from state to state. Some statutes are very detailed and were
obviously drafted with great care.281 Other statutes are relatively
short282 and appear to leave numerous issues open.283 Since LLC
277. Wyoming did so in 1977, and Florida adopted LLC legislation in 1982. Wyo.
STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -136 (1989 & Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401 to -471 (West
1993 & Supp. 1994).
278. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
279. See discussion of the two draft model statutes supra note 21.
280. For example, two competing goals are certainty and flexibility. One type of LLC
statute emphasizes the benefits of creating an entity that will be taxed as a partnership.
These statutes are basically fool proof in that any LLC created under the auspices of such
legislation will satisfy the current IRS regulations concerning what it takes for an unincor-
porated association to qualify as a partnership for federal tax purposes. E.g., Wyo. STAT.
§§ 17-15-101 to -136 (1989 & Supp. 1994). The other type of statute emphasizes the flexi-
bility of the LLC form. LLCs formed under such legislation can be organized so as to
satisfy the current partnership tax regulations, but careless drafting or planning might well
result in an LLC that is classified by the IRS as an association taxable as a corporation.
E.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1106 (1993).
281. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 322B.01-.960 (West Supp. 1994).
282. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401-471 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 17-7601 to -7651 (Supp. 1993); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -136 (1989 & Supp.
1994).
283. Many states, for example, do not address the issue of whether LLCs can be used
by professional groups such as physicians, accountants, or attorneys. E.g., OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2000-2060 (West Supp. 1994). Other states have language about the appar-
ent authority of members and managers, which is confusing at best. See supra notes 151-
166 and accompanying text. Other statutes omit any discussion of various potential rights
of members, such as the right to petition for dissolution, the right to request information
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legislation is so new and unsettled, it is inevitable that many states will
be undertaking review of, and amendment to, their LLC statutes.284
One potential consideration for state legislators might be to
adopt a statutory form that makes application of the federal securities
laws less likely-particularly if the LLC form is seen as a vehicle for
attracting in-state investment.2 5 If this is a goal, as this Article sug-
gests, a number of provisions might be considered.
The most obvious suggestion is to create a default rule that pro-
vides for member management of the LLC. Since member-managed
LLCs are so analogous to general partnerships in terms of the par-
ticipatory rights of equity owners, the strongest case for avoiding ap-
plication of the federal securities laws can be made in the case of such
LLCs. Therefore, a state that provides this as the default rule may
make it more likely that LLCs formed under its statute will avoid ap-
plication of federal securities laws to their LLC membership
interests. 8 6
Currently, there is quite a range of default rules relating to man-
agement of LLCs. While most states specify that members will have
management rights (unless the articles of organization and/or the op-
erating agreement delegates such authority to managers)2 87 some stat-
utes provide that the LLC will be controlled by managers unless the
members agree otherwise,2 8 or even that the LLC must be controlled
from the LLC, or the right to demand distributions upon withdrawal, leaving open the
question of whether members of LLCs in such jurisdictions will have such rights.
284. As of September 15, 1993, more than a dozen states were contemplating amend-
ments to their LLC statutes, or amendment to other statutes necessitated by the hasty
adoption of LLC legislation.
285. For example, this was apparently one of the motivations that led Florida to adopt
its LLC statute. See Richard Johnson, Comment, The Limited Liability Company Act, 11
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 387, 387 (1983).
286. In addition, this would add to uniformity among state laws. Since the majority of
state statutes already adopt the member-management model as a default rule for LLCs,
this would be a logical suggestion even if the only advantage were a greater degree of
consistency in LLC legislation. Accord UNIF. LLC AcT (1993 Draft), supra note 21, at
§ 301.
287. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.422 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-7612 (Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/10-10 (Smith-Hurd. Supp. 1994);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:1311 (West Supp. 1994); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 86.291
(Michie 1994); R.I. GN. LAws § 7-16-14 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125 (1994);
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1022 (Michie 1993).
288. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 332B.606 (West Supp. 1994) (management authority vested
in a board of governors unless the members elect otherwise); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 2013 (West Supp. 1994); TEx. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 2.12 (West Supp. 1994).
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by managers. 28 9 Of these three options,290 the statutes which provide
the most support for the proposition that LLC membership interests
generally should not be securities are those which specify that man-
agement will be vested in the members unless the articles of organiza-
tion specify that managers will have such authority.2 91
In addition to member management, statutes could also be
drafted to make it clear that members could elect to retain apparent
authority2 92 even after designating managers.2 93 A few states have ap-
parently attempted to accomplish this.2 94 Some states address the
289. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-401 (West Supp. 1993). The members may in fact
be the managers, but this would have to be by election, not by virtue of their status as
members. See also N.D. CENr. CODE § 10-32-69.1 (1994).
290. In addition to the three models discussed above, one statute does not directly
address the management of the LLC. MD. CODE. ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-401(a)
(1993). The Maryland Code does, however, provide that every member is an agent of the
LLC, with authority to bind the entity unless the articles of organization contain a limita-
tion of the members' authority. Id. This is basically consistent with the member-manage-
ment model; thus, Maryland has been characterized in this Article as adopting member-
management as a default model.
291. The 1993 discussion draft of the Uniform LLC Act adopts the default rule of
member-management. UNiF. LLC Act (1993 Draft), supra note 21, at § 301(a). The ABA
project would also have adopted the member-management model as a default rule. DRAFT
PROTOTYPE LLC ACT (1992), supra note 21, at §§ 301, 401.
292. Apparent authority is derived from basic agency principles and refers to the
power to bind a principal even absent actual authority. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 8 (1958). "Apparent authority is the power to affect the legal relations of an-
other person by transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising
from and in accordance with the other's manifestations to such third persons." Id.
293. This is referred to throughout as a hybrid-management model. See discussion
supra notes 149-166 and accompanying text.
294. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-654(A)(1-2), (B)(2-3) (Supp. 1993) (detailing the
agency powers of members in both the member- and manager-managed models); ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 4-32-301, 4-32-401 (Michie Supp. 1993) (detailing the agency powers of
members in both the member- and manager-managed models); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. &
Ass'NS § 4A-401(a) (1993) (providing that every member is an agent of the LLC unless the
articles provide to the contrary); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2019 (West Supp. 1994) (ad-
dressing the agency powers of managers only); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-20 (1992) (address-
ing the agency powers of managers only); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2b-125(1)-(2) (1994)
(detailing the agency powers of members in both the member- and manager-managed
models).
The model legislation that is currently being considered by the Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws also addresses the issue of authority of members and managers. UNIF.
LLC ACT (1993 Draft), supra note 21, at § 301. The Draft Prototype LLC Act also ad-
dressed the agency powers of members and managers. DRAFT PROTOTYPE LLC ACT
(1992), supra note 21, at §§ 301, 401. Although the Prototype legislation has apparently
been abandoned by the ABA, this section is particularly important since it apparently
served as the model for the LLC legislation in several states.
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agency authority of both members and managers, 295 while others ad-
dress only one side of the issue.296 The majority of states, however,
specify that the members will have exclusive power to manage the
LLC unless the articles and/or operating agreement contain an ex-
press delegation of such authority to managers, in which case manag-
ers will have the exclusive power.297
The reason that some states address the issue of member and
manager authority to bind the LLC is probably derived from the cur-
rent tax regulations concerning centralized management.298 The cur-
rent regulations, while less than perfectly clear, seem to indicate that
an organization will possess centralized management if any person or
persons other than all of the members have the exclusive authority to
make management decisions that bind the business.299 In the context
of general partnerships, this test is met even if the partners delegate
exclusive actual authority to one or more managers because "even if
the partners agree among themselves that the powers of management
shall be exclusively in a selected few, this agreement will be ineffective
as against an outsider who had no notice of it.''300 Because persons
wishing to form an LLC may wish to avoid the corporate characteris-
tic of centralized management, some statutes have apparently been
drafted with the intent of allowing an LLC to elect a manager-man-
295. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-654, -681 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-
32-301, 4-32-401 (Michie Supp. 1993); IND. CODE § 23-18-3-1 (Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 48-2b-125 (1994).
296. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2019 (West Supp. 1994) (addressing only the
authority of managers); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-20 (1992)(addressing only the authority of
managers); MD. CODE ANN., CoRPs & Ass'NS § 4A-401 (1993) (addressing only the au-
thority of members).
297. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.422 (West
1993 & Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.702 (West Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
805, para. 180/15-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (Supp. 1993);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1311 (West Supp. 1994); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 86.291
(Michie 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1022 (Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-18
(Supp. 1994); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-116 (1989 & Supp. 1994). But see COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 7-80-401 (West Supp. 1993) (giving managers the exclusive power to manage).
Although it does not mention agency authority or the right to bind the entity explic-
itly, the effect of a provision giving either members or managers the exclusive power to
manage is almost certain that in member-managed LLCs, the members have both actual
and apparent authority to bind the LLC. Further, in manager-managed LLCs, managers
are in the same position. There is no possibility of designating actual authority to manag-
ers while one or more of the members retain the apparent authority to bind the LLC
simply by virtue of their status as members.
298. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
299. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1) (as amended in 1993).
300. Id. at § 301.7701-2(c)(4).
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agement model, while leaving enough authority in the hands of mem-
bers so that centralized management is lacking. 301
This analysis is also relevant to the securities classification of LLC
membership interests. A membership interest that includes the right
to bind the LLC is not likely to be issued to an uninformed, passive
investor who needs the protection of the securities laws. 302
The problem is that most statutes fall short of accomplishing this
with any degree of clarity. Those states that ignore the issue alto-
gether apparently do not permit the LLC to chose a management
structure that delegates actual authority to managers while retaining
significant management rights for the members. 303 Those statutes that
deal only with the apparent authority of managers also fail to provide
maximum flexibility to LLCs in regard to establishing a structure in
which membership interests are least likely to be treated as
securities.304
Of the remaining statutory models, the Utah statute provides that
members in a member-managed LLC will have the authority to bind
the LLC, unless the articles of organization provide otherwise. 30 5 This
statute does not provide for retention of apparent authority by mem-
bers when a manager-managed LLC is organized. In one section, the
Arkansas statute provides that all members have apparent authority
to bind the LLC unless the articles of organization delegate such au-
thority to managers, 30 6 which by implication should mean that a pur-
ported delegation of authority in an operating agreement would be
sufficient to strip members of actual but not apparent authority. Un-
fortunately, the next section of the Arkansas statute provides that if
301. Certain comments to the 1993 Draft of the Uniform Limited Liability Company
Act seem to confirm this reasoning by explicitly referring to the centralized management
test set forth in Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) "which implicitly recognizes a dichotomy be-
tween 'exclusive authority to make management decisions' and 'the agency power to bind
the entity."' UNIF. LLC Acr (1993 Draft), supra note 21, § 301 cmt.
302. It would clearly not be in the best interests of the LLC to keep investors who have
the authority to bind the LLC in the dark as to material developments. Thus, the presence
of this characteristic is likely to indicate an interest to which there is no need to apply the
securities laws. Since giving members the right to bind the LLC is tantamount to saying
that they are not expected to rely on the entrepreneurial efforts of others, this would mean
that the LLC membership interests would fail the Howey test and would not be considered
to be securities.
303. Those rights would be inherent in any model where a member in a manager-man-
aged LLC retained apparent authority to bind the entity.
304. Oklahoma and Rhode Island fit this pattern. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2019
(West Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-20 (1992).
305. UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125 (1994).
306. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-301 (Michie Supp. 1993).
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managers are designated in an operating agreement, they will have
exclusive power to manage the LLC.3 0 7 The question of what these
two provisions mean when read together is debatable.
The Arizona legislation is not subject to any of these criticisms.
The agency powers of members and managers are addressed in a sepa-
rate provision which explains first that unless the articles vest manage-
ment in one or more managers, all members have actual and apparent
authority to carry on the LLC's usual business.30 8 The second subsec-
tion of this provision says that if the articles do vest the management
rights in manager(s), members lose their agency status except to the
extent that the manager delegates authority to them or as provided in
the operating agreement.30 9 There is nothing inconsistent with this
scheme in the second statutory provision dealing with management
rights310 which provides that management authority is vested in the
members unless the articles provide for managers, "subject to any pro-
vision in an operating agreement restricting or enlarging the manage-
ment rights or responsibilities of one or more members or classes of
members." 311
The Arizona statutory language, therefore, offers the best choice
of flexible provisions that permit LLCs to be organized with the
broadest range of management options, including those that are less
likely to result in membership interests that should be treated as
securities.
In addition to statutory rules that provide for a member-managed
LLC as a default model and permit delegation of actual authority to
managers while retaining significant management rights for members,
state LLC statutes could include a number of protective provisions.
The inclusion of such provisions should strengthen the argument that
states have chosen to regulate LLCs in a manner that adequately pro-
tects potential investors. For example, statutes could provide detailed
informational rights to members.
307. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-401 (Michie Supp. 1993). This ambiguity can be traced
to the fact that the Arkansas Legislature chose to rely on the draft of the Prototype LLC
Act, which was then being worked upon by a working group of an ABA subcommittee.
See DRAFr PROTOTYPE LLC Acr, supra note 21, §§ 301, 401. This draft has apparently
been abandoned by the ABA in favor of the project currently underway by the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws.
308. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-654.A. (Supp. 1993).
309. ARMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-654.B. (Supp. 1993).
310. ARiz. REv. STAT. AN. § 29-681. (Supp. 1993).
311. ARIZ. R-v. STAT. ANN. § 29-681.A. (Supp. 1993).
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Although a number of state statutes do not explicitly address the
informational rights of LLC members,312 other states currently have
provisions requiring the LLC to maintain detailed records and to pro-
vide some or all of that information to members upon a proper re-
quest.313 Of those statutes, some require the LLC to provide
members with any of the listed records or even other material infor-
mation any time the member can show a reasonable purpose.314 How-
ever, other statutes permit the LLC to specify circumstances under
which such information will be made available,315 and it is apparently
possible under some of these statutes that the LLC might eliminate
this statutory right altogether.31 6
To make the strongest argument that the state LLC statutes gen-
erally provide sufficient protection for investors so that there is no
need for application of the federal securities laws, strong informa-
tional rights are very desirable. The ideal statutory model would be
one that requires any LLC to provide all members with material infor-
mation upon the showing of a reasonable purpose.
The draft of the Uniform LLC Act does require that an LLC pro-
vide its members with access to its books and records upon the show-
ing of a proper purpose.31 7 This draft, however, does not provide any
312. The Florida, Nevada, West Virginia, and Wyoming LLC statutes do not mention
informational rights. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401-.471 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.011-.571 (Michie 1994); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-1A-1 to -69 (Supp.
1994); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -136 (1989 & Supp. 1994). Kansas requires an annual
report that must be filed with the state. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7647 (Supp. 1993). Presum-
ably, a member in a Kansas LLC can obtain substantial financial information from the
annual report, which is a matter of public record.
313. See statutes cited supra note 127.
314. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-607 (Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-
80-411 (West Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/1-40 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.375 (West Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2021
(West Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-22 (1992); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
1528n, § 2.22 (West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-119 (1994).
315. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-405 (Michie Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-
305 (1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.709 (West Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:1319 (West Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-406(c) (1993); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-1028 (Michie 1993).
316. Both Arkansas and Louisiana have LLC legislation that provides that members
have the right to inspect the LLC records, except as otherwise provided in the articles or
an operating agreement. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-405 (Michie Supp. 1993); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12:1319 (West Supp. 1994). The Louisiana statute, however, complicates the
situation by adding the following sentence at the end of the section on records: "Rights
under this Section shall not be affected by any actual or constructive notice ... to the
contrary." The effect of this sentence, which seems to contradict the preceding language, is
unclear.
317. UNIF. LLC Act (1993 Draft), supra note 21, § 410.
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guidance on what books and records must be kept. The justification
for this is that many small businesses might not keep formal books
and records in any given format and it should be sufficient to require
that an LLC provide its members with whatever records it actually
possesses.318
While there apparently is good reason to expect small businesses
to operate more informally, a list of certain items that would have to
be included is certainly a good idea in order to provide a reasonable
level of protection for investors. Items that could be required without
imposing an undue burden on the smaller businesses organized as
LLCs include a list of members and their addresses; the articles of
organization and any amendments; all written operating agreements
and any amendments; federal, state, and local tax returns for the last
three years; and copies of any financial statements. Several states
have such a list in their LLC statutes.319
Another example of a possible protective provision would be for
statutes to spell out the right of members to withdraw and receive the
fair value of their membership interest. Such a right would strengthen
the argument that the state legislation includes sufficient protection so
that LLC membership interests would not need to be classified as
securities.
A number of state statutes do not specifically address what hap-
pens when a member withdraws, except to say that this is an event of
disassociation, which in turn triggers dissolution of the LLC unless the
remaining members elect to continue the LLC in existence. 320 Some
of the LLC statutes provide that, subject to contrary agreement of the
parties in the articles or an operating agreement, a member has the
right to receive the fair market value of his or her LLC membership
318. ld. at § 410 cmt. This language generally follows §§ 403(a) and (b) of the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act, which was approved by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws in 1992. 6 U.L.A. 465 (Supp. 1994).
319. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. AN. § 29-607 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-405
(Michie Supp. 1993); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-411 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 18-305 (1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.373 (West Supp. 1994).
320. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-601 to -857 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. 4-
32-101 to -1316 (Michie Supp. 1993); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80-101 to - 913 (West
Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401 -.471 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994); IowA CODE
ANN. §§ 490A.100 - 1601 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601 to -7650 (Supp.
1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1301-1369 (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 322B.01 -.960 (West Supp. 1994); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.011 -.571 (Michie 1994);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-16-1 to -75 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2b-102 to -157 (1994);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1073 (Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-1A-1 to -69
(Supp. 1994); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -136 (1989 & Supp. 1994).
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interest upon withdrawing from the LLC.32' Only one state requires
that an LLC pay a withdrawing member the fair value of his or her
membership interest, without providing that this requirement is sub-
ject to a contrary agreement expressed in either the articles or an op-
erating agreement.322 The current draft of the Uniform LLC Act
would also give a withdrawing member the absolute right to be paid
the fair value of the membership interest.323 The language of the draft
Uniform LLC Act is quite clear, and adequately protects the remain-
ing members in the case of a wrongfully dissociating member by speci-
fying that this right to be bought out does not affect any liability that
the wrongfully dissociating member may have for damages.
Yet another protection that could be incorporated into state LLC
legislation would give members the right to petition for judicial disso-
lution. As with the preceding suggestions, this would support the no-
tion that LLC membership interests do not need to be subject to the
federal securities laws because the state statutes assure sufficient pro-
tection for investors.324
A number of state statutes already have provisions governing ju-
dicial dissolution. However, the most common formulation permits
judicial dissolution only upon a showing that it is no longer reasonably
practical to carry on the business of the LLC in accordance with the
operating agreement.325 A few statutes do, however, permit judicial
dissolution upon proof of abuse of authority, fraudulent behavior, or
the like.32 6 The right to force judicial dissolution in the event of fraud-
321. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-603, -604 (1993); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. &
ASS'NS § 4A-905 (1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2027 (West Supp. 1994); TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, §§ 5.05, 5.06 (West Supp. 1994).
322. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 80/25-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994).
323. UNIF. LLC Acr (1993 Draft), supra note 21, §§ 602,701 (providing for mandatory
purchase of a dissociated member's interest).
324. See supra notes 126-136 and accompanying text.
325. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-785 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-902
(Michie Supp. 1993); IowA CODE ANN. § 490A.1302 (West Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12:1335 (West Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 4A-903 (1993);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-40 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1047 (Michie 1993); W. VA.
CODE § 31.1A-35 (Supp. 1994).
326. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-808 (West Supp. 1993) (permitting judicial dissolu-
tion upon a showing of abuse of authority); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.448 (West 1993 & Supp.
1994) (permitting judicial dissolution upon a showing of fraud or abuse of power); ILL
ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/35-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994) (permitting judicial dissolu-
tion upon a showing of illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent and detrimental behavior); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-7629 (Supp. 1993) (permitting judicial dissolution upon a showing of per-
sistent fraud, illegality, or abuse of power); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.833 (West Supp.
1994) (permitting judicial dissolution upon a showing of fraud, illegality, unfairly prejudi-
cial behavior, or that assets are being misapplied or wasted).
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ulent or oppressive behavior would provide a significant protection to
investors, adding support to the position that there is no need for LLC
membership interests to be classified as securities.
B. Drafting and Planning Strategies
In addition to the foregoing legislative options, a number of draft-
ing or planning strategies can be employed in the formation and oper-
ation of LLCs to make it less likely that the federal securities laws will
apply to any transfer of membership interests. As with legislative pos-
sibilities, the most obvious possibility relates to member-management.
Currently, only one jurisdiction has chosen a legislative scheme
that mandates manager-management, although one other state comes
close to that position.3 27 In every other state, either the default rule
provides for member-management 328 or the statute permits the LLC
to elect the member-management model.329 In states where member-
management is allowed, selection of this option is the best technique
for avoidance of the securities laws.3 30 Even in Colorado and North
Dakota, which appear not to permit member-management, if the LLC
has a written operating agreement which specifies that all members
must be selected or automatically serve as managers, one can argue
that this is essentially equivalent to a general partnership and that the
federal securities laws should not apply.
The problem is that many LLCs may desire or need a more cen-
tralized management model. One could possibly accomplish this by
giving all members general management authority while delegating
actual authority over most decisions to an executive committee, or the
like. Certainly the adoption of this model in the context of general
partnerships does not result in general partnership interests being
327. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80401 (West Supp. 1993). The North Dakota statute
can also be interpreted as mandating the election of a board of governors; however, since
the statute also says that if the members desire to act by unanimous consent or vote, they
do not need to have governors, this is not entirely certain. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-69.1
(1994).
328. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.422 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-7612 (Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para 180/10-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:1311 (West Supp. 1994); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 86.312
(Michie 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-14 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN'. § 48-2b-125 (1994);
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1022 (Michie 1993).
329. E.g., MNN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.606 (West Supp. 1994) (management authority
vested in a board of governors unless the members elect otherwise); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 2013 (West Supp. 1994); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 2.12 (West Supp.
1994).
330. See supra notes 149-150 and accompanying text.
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classified as securities, unless the designation is so complete that the
non-managing general partners retain no powers greater than a lim-
ited partner would ordinarily have.331 From a practical perspective,
the down side to this suggestion is that all members would presumably
retain statutory management authority, which might encompass ap-
parent authority to bind the LLC.332
In instances where the LLC needs a more centralized manage-
ment model than pure member-management, and it is not practicable
or desirable to permit members to retain apparent authority to bind
the enterprise, other steps will have to be taken to avoid application of
the securities laws. While it would certainly not hurt to adopt articles
of organization or an operating agreement providing members with all
the protective provisions discussed in the preceding section,333 such
provisions would not have the same weight as if they were included in
a statute. Unlike inclusion of such provisions in a state statute, mere
inclusion of such provisions in the organizational and operating docu-
ments of individual LLCs does not support the notion that functions
of federal securities laws are adequately fulfilled.
Probably the best advice with regard to the federal securities laws
for LLCs that decline to adopt the member-management model is that
all transactions involving the transfer of membership interest should
be structured with some exemption in mind, at least until the courts
have provided sufficient assurance that the securities laws will gener-
ally not be applied to such transactions.334
331. See supra notes 105-106.
332. In a few states, this attribute is explicit. For example, in Utah, the LLC statute
provides that members in a member-managed LLC will have the authority to bind the LLC
unless the articles of organization provide otherwise. UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125
(Supp. 1994). The Arkansas statute provides in one section that all members have appar-
ent authority to bind the LLC unless the articles of organization delegate such authority to
managers. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-301 (Michie Supp. 1993). The Arizona statute says
that unless the articles vest management in one or more managers, all members have actual
and apparent authority to carry on the LLC's usual business. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-
654.A. (Supp. 1993).
333. These would include the right of each member to obtain information from the
LLC upon a reasonable request; the right to withdraw and receive the fair value of the
membership interest being surrendered; the right to cause dissolution in the event of fraud,
duress, oppression, or otherwise. See supra notes 126-136 and accompanying text.
334. A discussion of the available securities exemptions is far beyond the scope of this
Article.
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V. Conclusion
The question of whether and when the federal securities laws will
and should apply to membership interests is not easy to answer, espe-
cially given the extreme diversity among and flexibility of the state
LLC statutes. While it seems clear that membership interests in mem-
ber-managed LLCs or LLCs with hybrid-management should gener-
ally not be securities, and good arguments can be made that most
membership interests in manager-managed LLCs should not be secur-
ities, there is no certainty that courts will agree with this analysis.
Policy arguments generally support the conclusion that member-
ship interests in LLCs need not be subjected to the burdens of the
federal securities laws. If state legislators are willing to amend their
statutes to give members a greater range of authority and to enhance
protective provisions, an even stronger case could be made that LLC
membership interests should not be classified as securities. If not, in
order to avoid the potentially devastating civil penalties for the unreg-
istered sale of securities, LLCs that decline to adopt the member-man-
agement model should structure transactions involving the transfer of
membership interests so as to comply with one or more exemptions
from registration.
It is always possible that unscrupulous con artists will seize on the
LLC as a new vehicle for defrauding the unsuspecting members of the
public and, in fact, there is some indication that this may have already
occurred in isolated instances.335 However, the solution of protecting
investors by requiring registration or exemption for all or even most
LLC membership interests seems akin to using a high-powered rifle to
kill the cockroach. The costs imposed by requiring LLCs to treat the
sale of membership interests as securities may well substantially di-
minish the usefulness of the form of entity. Although the expenses of
registration might be avoided if a sale of LLC membership interests is
structured in such a way that it is intended to comply with an exemp-
tion, the additional costs of complying with the exemption and the
risks if the exemption is ultimately found to have been unavailable
make this a generally undesirable approach for a business entity
uniquely suited for smaller and start-up businesses.
335. See, e.g., Vicki Cabot, State Lawmakers Moving to Reform Limited Liability, ARI-
ZONA Bus. GAZsTrE, Feb. 10, 1994, (Leisure), at 22 ("Limited liability structure .... has
been called the perfect vehicle for fraud. That's why state lawmakers are moving to tighten
reporting requirements for the new business structure.").
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The best argument for applying the federal securities laws can be
made in the case of an LLC organized so that investors are forced into
uninformed passivity, and in which the membership interests are
widely marketed. In the typical LLC, however, this is not likely to be
the case, and a presumption against application of the federal securi-
ties laws seems justified if the LLC is truly to be a boon to the small
business.
